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THE Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights has once again
called public attention to the discrepancy between American aspiration and
accomplishment in race relations.' Housing clearly illustrates the national
failure to treat individuals on the basis of individual merit rather than racial
myth. In the construction of the twelve million homes required in the next
decade to meet America's needs,2 either present patterns of racial segrega-
tion will be perpetuated, or racially integrated housing will be encouraged.
Since the course of the law will be a major factor in determining which of
these alternative housing patterns develops in the future, it seems impera-
tive to reconsider the basic constitutional issue: to what extent do the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit racial discrimination in private or in
publicly aided housing? Legal reevaluation is made all the more pressing by
the restrictive covenant cases (awaiting decision on the merits for the first
time in the Supreme Court), and by the first case involving discrimination
in a redevelopment project. The ingredients of a fresh appraisal are a realis-
tic picture of Negro housing in America and a review and critique of the
decisions involving discrimination by government or private home owners.
NEGRO HOUSING IN AziERICA
The condition of Negro-occupied residences best illustrates the problem
of racial discrimination in housing. All available data demonstrate that Ne-
gro homes are substandard, overcrowded, segregated, generally inferior-in
every section of the country, and on every income level.3
1. To SECURE THESE RIGH Ts: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ONt CIVIL
RIGHTS (1947). Hereafter cited as Civ. RTs. REP.
2. ". .. [I]n order to put the housing plant of the United States in reasonable shape
there should be built in 10 years about 12,000,000 houses." Statement by Senator Taft,
Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 287, S. 866, S. 701, and S. 801-1
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947). See also NAT. Ass'N OF HOUSING OFFICIALS, HOUSING FOR
THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE WAR 7 (1944); ROSENMAN, A MILLION HOMES A YEAR
(1945); Blandford, Wanted 12 Million New Houses, 34 NAT. MUNIC. REV. 376 (1945) ;Mr.
Wyatt's Shortage, Fortune, April, 1946, p. 105.
3. The statistical data to be presented are corroborated by sociological descriptions
of Negro housing. "Nothing is so obvious about the Negroes' level of living as the fact that
most of them suffer from poor housing conditions." MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
376 (1944). See also, e.g., DRAKE AND CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS (1945); WooFTER,
NEGRO PROBLEMS IN CITIES (1928).
The intensive study of Negro youth prepared for the American Youth Commission
in 1940 attested to the inferiority of Negro housing. The summary statement was: "Negro
homes, all in all, are dreary dwellings, on neglected streets without pavements, littered by
accumulated wastes, in the oldest sections of the city." REID, IN A MINOR KEY 25 (1940).
Reports from each section of the country described poor housing. ATWOOD, WYATT, DAVIS
AND WALKER, THUS BE THEIR DESTINY 2, 12-3, 43, 68-70 (1941) (Milton, Pa., Greensboro,
N.C. and Galesburg, Ill.); DAVIS, GARDNER AND GARDNER, DEEP SOUTH 22, 50-4, 387-8,
468-70 (1941) (urban and rural); FRAZIER, NEGRO YOUTH AT TlE CROSSWAYS,6-18, 200,
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
In urban areas, for example, a few comparative percentages from an offi-
cial study indicate the extent of the inferiority: in Hartford, 29.9% of the
Negro families as contrasted with 2.5% of the whites lived in dwellings unfit
for use or in need of major repairs; in Milwaukee, the corresponding contrast
was 67.7% for Negroes to 6.5% for whites; in Detroit, 33.7% and 6.8%;
and in Birmingham, 56.5% and 19.7%. 4 Other investigations into the avail-
ability of heating, kitchen and toilet facilities, reveal similar racial dispar-
ities.5
Furthermore, overcrowding is characteristic of Negro housing. Before the
war, 24% of Negro homes in Philadelphia housed more than one person per
290 (1940) (middle states); JoiwsoN, GROWING Up IN THE BLACK BELT 6, 11, 18, 23, 27,
35, 55-8, 226, at 68 quoting a Negro girl in Georgia, "I'd like to have a house that don't
leak, a house with no leaks in it anywhere. I wnants a comfortable house, a house you won't
freeze in in winter. I'd like to have nice things in the house, nice furniture so you could be
comfortable. I'd like for it to have smooth floors, not big loose planks." (1941) (rural
South); RED, op. di. supra, at 26-7 (summary); SUTHERLAND, COLOR, CLASS AND PERSON-
ALITY 13, 15, 17, 18, 20-1, 31, 35, 45, 69, 73, 97 (1942) (summary); WARNER, JUNxER AND
ADAmS, COLOR AND HumA" NATURE 168 (1941) (Chicago). See also REUTER, THE AA.ERX-
CAN RACE PROBLEm 222-3 (Rev. ed. 1938).
4. STERNER, THE NEGRO'S SHARE 190 (1943), summarizing unpublished tabulations
of the Federal Housing Administration. The following table, reproduced from p. 191, gives
the occupancy by Negroes in each community in terms of a percentage of all dwelling units,
of units needing major repairs, and of those unfit for use.
Needing Unfit
city All Dwelling Units Major Repairs for use
Buffalo, N.Y. 3.0% 10.1% 28.1%
Philadelphia, Pa. 12.7 46.7 66.8
Milwaukee (greater), Wis. 1.5 10.1 51.7
Raleigh, N.C. 30.6 82.1 82.0
Charlotte, N.C. 8.5 14.6 13.1
Atlanta, Ga. 36.3 57.3 81.4
Birmingham, Ala. 42.2 66.9 84.7
New Orleans, La. 31.9 57.8 74.1
In 1940,45% of dwelling units occupied by whites throughout the country were substandard,
as against 85% for non-whites. Weaver, Housing in a Democracy, 244 ANN,-.s 95 (1946).
An FHA study found 12.2% of the homes in "white" blocks in need of major repairs, 38.6%
in "mixed" blocks, and 50.9% in "non-white" blocks. FHA, THE SRcTURE AND GRoWTH
OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICAN CITIES 71 (1939). An official study in Dallas
in 1924-25 concluded that "a little less than 50 per cent of the houses presently occupied by
Negroes are reasonably fit for good family life, while nearly 20 per cent of the houses ought
actually to be destroyed." 6 PRESmENT's CONFERENCE ON HOME BUIDLNG AND HOnE
OWNERSHIP (NEGRO HOUsING) 126 (1932), hereafter cited as PREsmFras Co.NEcFnC In
Richmond, many of the new houses opened for Negroes in 1931 were "built in open violation
of the building code." Id. at 73. A sample inspection of one block in Harlem by the Urban
League in recent years revealed a violation of the building code in every instance. MOON,
THE HIGH COST OF PREJUDmCE 37 (1947). The documentation could be multiplied; see
generally, STERNER, op. Cit. supra, at 166-209.
5. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Consumer Use of Sdected Goods and Serriers, by In-
come Classes, MARKET RESEARCH SERIES 5-12, Table 5 (1935-7); STERNER, THE NEGRo's
SHARE 186-92 (1943).
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room, as compared to 12% of the white homes; in Detroit the percentages
were 26% Negro and 12% white; in Norfolk, 27% and 11%.6 Certain areas
of the Black Belt in Chicago have a population density of 90,000 per square
mile, while neighboring white apartments have a density of 20,000.7 Balti-
more Negroes, 20% of the city's population, are jammed into 2% of the
homes
In addition, Negro homes are cut.off from the rest of the community.
Official and unofficial mapping of the location of Negro residences reveals
clearly defined segregated areas.' An FHA study concluded that the in-
tensity of segregation increases directly with the number and proportion of
the non-white population. 10 In Chicago, for example, it has been estimated
that over 90% of the Negroes live in areas predominantly Negro." Segre-
gation distinguishes Negro housing from slum housing in general.
Since the segregation of Negroes is "indiscriminate," 12 all social and eco-
nomic segments of the race are trapped behind ghetto walls. The Negro who
strives to live by the social and ethical standards of the majority must reside,
nonetheless, in the neighborhood of poverty, filth and vice. As a conse-
quence of this and other forms of enforced segregation, full assimilation of
prevailing cultural values is not achieved." The distortion of social values
6. Id. at 193. In 1940, "While less than eight per cent of the dwelling units occupied
by urban whites were overcrowded, almost 25 per cent of the units occupied by urban Negroes
were overcrowded. Although the nonwhite urban population between 1930 and 1940 in-
creased 7.7 per cent, as compared to 7.2 per cent for whites, the supply of housing available
for non-whites increased 12.7 per cent as compared to 16.6 per cent for whites." Weaver,
supra note 4, at 95.
7. DRAKE AND CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS 204 (1945).
8. TENENBAUM, WHY MEN HATE 335 (1947). If the national population density were
the same as that of a-certain Harlem block, the entire U.S. population would require only
half the area of New York City. Ibid. In the Los Angeles "little Tokyo" area which housed
7,500 before the war, 30,000 Negroes lived during the war. NAT. URBAN LEAGUE, RACIAL
PROBLEMS IN HOUSING, BULL. No. 2 at 16 (3d ed. 1945). In Detroit, while the average unit
housed 3.8, "To house all Negro families at an average of 4.0 persons per occupied dwelling
unit would require 53,000 dwellings, or an increase of 19,000 over the number of dwellings
occupied by Negroes in 1940. However, 8,000 homes occupied by Negroes in 1940 were
physically sub-standard. Since many of the remaining homes occupied by Negroes are aged
frame structures, badly overcrowded, an equal number may be expected to become obsolete
over the next ten years." DETROIT CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, TiE PEOPLE OF DETROIT
19 (1946). On a country-wide average, the median number of rooms per dwelling unit in
1940 was 4.9 for white and 3.5 for Negro. Robinson, Relationship Between Conditions of
Dwellings and Rentals, by Race, 22 J. LAND & Pun. UT. EcoN. 296,300 (1946).
9. See WOOFTER, NEGRO PROBLEMS IN CITIES 40-67 (1928); FHA, op. cit. supra note
4, at 45, 47, 69-70.
10. FHA, op. cit. supra note 4, at 68.
11. DRAKE AND CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS 174 (1945).
12. PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE 26; DRAKE AND CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS 206 (1945).
13. Segregation is the "pathological feature of the Negro community." It "produces
an artificial situation in which inferior standards of excellence and efficiency are set up.
Since the Negro is not required to compete in the larger world and to assume its responsi-
bilities and suffer its penalties, he does not have an opportunity to mature." FRAZIER,
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in the Negro neighborhood is manifest in higher crime rates, and in relatively
greater expense to the community in required police, fire and health serv-
ices.14 In Chicago's Black Belt, for example, the rate of juvenile delinquency
is eight times, and the death rate almost twice that in the rest of the city."'
Moreover, through preoc-cupation with segregation, potentially creative en-
ergy is wasted by both the majority and minority races. This process of
waste is most dramatically illustrated in the race riot. Inferior, segregated
housing is one of the primary causes of strained race relations which period-
ically culminate in race warfare. 16
When the Negro seeks housing outside his segregated area, he is thwarted
NEGRO YOUTH AT ThE CROSSWAYS 290 (1940). Consciousness of discrimination affects
Negroes' attitudes towards important social issues, so that even war is looked at from a
race rather than from any broader point of view. Id. at xxii. "... . 'Many young Negroes
have never experienced the American dream. They have never mown a society compoced
of respectable, law-abiding, industrious, self-reliant families whose ambition has been re-
warded by good houses, electric refrigerators, and an improved social status." SuTrnvLLD,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 15. See also Cooper, The Frustrations of Bcing a Member of a Minor-
ity Group, 29 MENTAL HYGIENE 189 (1945). Additional insight is provided by a number of
novels: PEmRY, THE SREET (1946); WRIGHT, BLACK Boy (1945); MOON, DARKER BRorasa
(1943); WRIGHT, NATrvE SON (1940).
14. "At least three types of social pathology have been observed to have a high and
inescapable correlation with the character of Negro residence areas. These are: (1) A high
rate of delinquency, (2) A high rate of mortality, and (3) A distorted standard of living."
PREsmENT's CO-FRENCE 52. Rates of "dependency, family desertion and illegitimacy
... [are] high in those areas that were characterized by physical decay and lack of organized
community life." FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAImLY IN THE UNITED STATES 373-4 (1939). A
Chicago housing conference "listed among the 'ghetto conditions' high sickness and death
rates; a heavy relief load during the Depression; inadequate recreational facilities; lack of
building repairs; neglect of garbage disposal and street cleaning; overcrowded schools;
high rates of crime and juvenile delinquency; and rough treatment by the police." DRAEM
AND CAYTON, BLACK METROOLm 202 (1945). Segregation can also frustrate the operation
of a city plan: "Badly in need of a medical center, express highways, parks and other de-
ferred civic improvements, Detroit must wait indefinitely for them. The land they will
occupy now houses hundreds of Negro families who can't be evicted because there's no
place for them to go." Velie, Housing: Detroit's Time Bomb, Colliers, Nov. 23, 1946, p. 15,
col. 1.
15. GERTz, AmERICAN GHETTos 8 (1947). Such data generally show an improvement
when decent housing is provided. See GRAy, HOUSING AD CiTizEsSmP 125-6 (1946);
JOHNSON, INTO THE MAIN S.a. 223 (1947); MooN, THE HIGH CoST oF PREJUDICE 37
(1947). In a Cincinnati housing project for Negroes, built in the twenties with private funds,
the rate of arrest was 1 per 215 inhabitants annually; the rate in the city generally was 1 per
15 for whites and I per 7Y2 for Negroes. PREsmENT's CoN-FERENE 105.
16. LEE, RACE RIOT 60, 89, 93, 119 (1943) analyzes the Detroit riots. Even in the
absence of riots, violence is part of the race housing picture. E.g., "From May 1944 through
July 1946-a period of twenty-seven months-59 attacks were made on Negro residences
in Chicago. About half were arson-bombings. There were 22 cases of stoning, three shoot-
ings, three house-wrecklngs, two stench-bombings. Three persons were ldfled and many
were injured." GERTz, AMERICAN GHETos 10 (1947). See also MYRDAL, A, A!auIcu.
DILEMMA 624 (1944); PRESmENT's CONFERENCE 46; Martin, The Truth About Sojourner
Truth, 49 CRISIS 112 (1942); BROWN, WHY RACE RIOTS (1944).
"Anyone who has investigated the problem of group tensions has always ended up
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by discrimination enforced informally or in the courts. The public housing
available to lower income groups includes many segregated projects. 7 In
redevelopment housing projects, financed by private investment companies
and accommodating lower middle-class tenants, the redevelopment com-
panies' privilege of discrimination has been upheld in an initial court test.' 8
Since these projects, authorized in the past few years in twenty states,0 may
soon become the most significant source of new dwelling units,20 the decision
as to whether they shall be segregated or mixed may be crucial for the es-
tablishment of future racial patterns in American housing. In seeking to
buy or build a home of his own, the Negro is faced with the restrictive cov-
enant, apparently the most widely used technique for enforcing discrimina-
tion in private housing. In large cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles
racial covenants have almost completely cut off any possibility of expanding
the Negro housing area. 2 ' Most covenants are imposed by the original sub-
dividers, 22 or reflect the participation of realtors' organizations in their draft-
with the belief that nothing radical can be achieved until the walls of segregated, hemmed-in,
ghetto living have been destroyed." TENENBAUm, WHY MEN HATE 333 (1947). There ap-
pears to be unanimity among writers on race relations that housing is the crucial issue. For
typical statements, see DRAKE AND CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS 114 (1945); MOTON, WHAT
THE NEGRO THINKS 117 (1929); THE NEGRO PROBLEM: HOUSING A BASIC FACTOR (reprint
by American Council on Race Relations of war time columns by Barry Bishop in the Dallas
Morning News).
17. See pp. 436 infra.
18. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 118 N.Y.L.J. 163 (Sup. Ct. July29, 1947). See
pp. 437-44 infra.
19. For a comparative analysis of state urban redevelopment legislation see Hearings
before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 485-524 (1945);
NAT. ASS'N OF HOUSING OFFICIALS, SUMMARY OF THE 1945 HOUSING YEAR 9-14 (1946).
20. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, for example, a leading investor in redevel-
opment housing, has over 100,000 tenants in its projects. Statement of Mr. George Gove,
Vice-President of Metropolitan Life, Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency
on S. 287, 866, 701, and 801-4, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 336-42 (1947). Because of incentives
in the form of tax subsidy and use of public authority, redevelopment housing is bound to
increase. See notes 55, 57, 60, 61 infra.
21. ". . . Many areas, particularly large cities in the North and West, such as Chicago,
Cleveland, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, are widely affected. The amount of land
covered by racial restrictions in Chicago has been estimated at 80 per cent. Students of the
subject state that virtually all new subdivisions are blanketed by these covenants." Civ.
RTs. REP. 68.
In Chicago, estimates of land coverage by covenants have gone as high as 85% and
it has been stated that in the entire city there are "only 500 to 600 lots . . . known to be
available in any but the worse slum areas upon which housing can be built for Negro occu-
pancy without the use of eminent domain." NAT. URBAN LEAGUE, op. eil. supra note 8,
at 16. In Los Angeles, a recent "fever of cases" attests to the extent of covenants, GERTz,
AMERICAN GHETTos 6 (1947).
22. See, e.g., Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63 Cal. App.2d 230, 146 P.2d 720 (1944); Letteau
v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932); Janss Investment Co. v. Walden, 196 Cal,
753, 239 Pac. 34 (1925); Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596
(1919); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470 (1919);
Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); Edwards v. West Woodbridge Theater
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ing, recordation, enforcement and general administration.2 These organi-
zations prey on existing fears that loss of property values, social status and
neighborhood friends will follow when a Negro moves into a community.24
Attempts to justify this pervasive pattern of segregation in terms of Negro
traits follow three recurring types of argument, none of which seems tenable.
Thus, it is often alleged that the Negro is an irresponsible tenant, notwith-
standing the excellent rent-paying " and maintenance :' records of Negroes
Co., 55 F.2d 524 (App. D.C. 1931); Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 30 F.2d 983 (App. D.C. 1929);
McCurdy v. Standard Realty Corp., 295 Ky. 586, 175 S.W.2d 28 (1943); Queensborough
Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915); MRSA v. Reynolds, 317 Mich. 632, 27
N.V.2d 40 (1947); Northwest Civic Ass'n v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 N.W.2d 36 (1947);
Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922); Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N.C. 290,
37 S.E.2d 895 (1946); Yernon v. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 710 (1946);
Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 296 N.Y. Supp. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Bulen v. Rice,
11 Ohio L. Abs. 175 (Ohio App. 1931); Crump v. Perryman, 193 S.W.2d 233 (Civ.App.
Tex. 1946). In Detroit, approximately 90% of race covenants have been imposed by original
subdividers. BLACK, PATTERNS OF REsTrncTLVE CovENANTs (unpublished thesis, Wayne
University, 1948). A study of subdivisions opened in the past 10 years in Queens, Nassau
and Southern Westchester Counties in New York shows that 83% of the larger (75 homes
and over) projects are restricted from the start. Architectural Forum, Oct., 1947, p. 16. See
Dean, Only Caucasian: A Study of Race Corenants, 23 J. LAND & PuB. UT. EcoN. 428 (1947).
23. See, e.g., Russell v. Wallace, 30 F.2d 981 (App. D.C. 1929); Meade v. Dennistone,
173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938); Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.WV.2d 679 (Mo. 1946), ceri.
granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1751 (1947); Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W.2d 175 (St. Louis Ct. App.
1939); Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. 166,44 S.V.2d 857 (1931).
"The most stubborn resistance in America to Negro advance is offered by realtors and
landholders." CONRAD, JIM CRow ANmERI 234 (1947). See also MYRWAL, Ax A IEmac¢,
DILEMMA 624 (1944); NAT. URBAN LEAGUE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16-7; JOuNSON,, I:To
TaE MAIN STREAm 220 (1947).
See various publications of National Association of Real Estate Boards which has filed a
brief amicus supporting covenants in the pending litigation. Local organizations, also, have
issued publications, e.g., CHICAGO FEDERATION OF NEIGIIBORIIOOD As sOcIONS, RESTXC-
TiVE COVENANTS (1944). "The agreements which have been used in ... Chicago ... on
the South Side have been prepared by the Chicago Real Estate Board and have been ap-
proved by the Chicago Title And Trust Company." Letter of Albert H. Veeder, Attorney, to
Oscar H. Boenicke, May 15, 1936. One Chicago association has boasted that the 104 blocks
it covers is 100% covenanted against Negroes. Weaver, Race Restrictire Housing Carenants,
20 J. LAND & PUB. UT. EcoN. 183, 188 (1944). In St. Louis, approximately 85% of all cov-
enants were drawn in the same form by the Real Estate Exchange. Note, 3 NAT. BAR J.
50, 51 (1945).
24. See, e.g., JonNsoN, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 11-2 (1943); Weaver, supra
note 4, at 96. The latter author suggests that occupancy standards be substituted for racial
restrictive covenants in new developments as a means of conserving property values. Id. at
102; Planning for More Flexible Land Use, 23 J. LAND & Pun. UT. EcoN. 29,41 (1947).
25. "For 155 projects in 59 cities having two or more FPHA-aided projects, at least
one of which is occupied by Negro tenants, the following results are reported: Collection
losses do not exceed one percent of the total operating incomes for a total of 142 of these
projects, 72 of which are occupied by Negroes and 70 by white or other tenants. Five of
the 13 projects showing rental losses in excess of one per cent are tenanted by Negroes and
8 are tenanted by whites or others. The collection loss records between the two racial groups
do not differ more than one per cent in 51 of the 59 cities and the records are identical in
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who have been given the opportunity to live in modern housing develop-
ments. Also, on the assumption that each man gets the full housing value
he can pay for, it is frequently argued that Negroes cannot obtain better
housing because of inability to pay rather than because of discrimination.
But Negro families get less for their housing dollar than white families on
the same income level; 2 and, indeed, the relative inferiority actually en-
creases as the rental value increases.28 Finally, it is contended that segre-
gation is inevitable because Negroes and whites cannot live together, but
this assertion is refuted by a substantial body of evidence on interracial
living in federal housing projects. 29 In 325 federal projects providing for
occupancy by both Negro and white tenants, the policy ranged from setting
34." Weaver, Race Restrictive Housing Covenants, 20 J. LAND & PUB. UT. ECON. 183, 189
(1944).
26. For data on Negro maintenance, see PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE 249-57; JOHNSON,
To STEM THis TIDE 61 (1943); Weaver, supra note 25, at 191 n.24.
27. "The rent of Negro dwellings is a plain indlication of the exploitation of Negro
neighborhoods. These rents are excessive whether they are measured by the kind of house
and equipment, by the relation of rents paid by Negroes and those paid by white people
for similar quarters, by the steady increase in rents, by the relation of rent to the value of
the property, or by the proportion which rent forms of the family budget." WOOFTER,
NEGRO PROBLEMS IN CITIES 121 (1928) with supporting data on preceding pages. "Negro
residents of the Chicago 'Black Belt' pay as much per cubic foot per room as that paid by
wealthy residents for equivalent space of the Lakeside Drive." Cayton, Negro Housing in
Action, Social Action, April 5, 1940, p. 18. See also FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THlE
UNITED STATES 458 (1939); MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 625 (1944); PRESIDLNT'S
CONFERENCE 26,58; and note 28 infra.
28. For the following data based on the 1940 Housing Census, see Robinson, supra
note 8, at 297:
Percentage of Sub-standard Units inEach Rental racket
Monthly Rental 16 Northern and
Value (Est.) Total Western Cities 26Sotthern Distrtis
Ratio Ratio Ratio
White Non- Non-white\ White Non- (Non-whiteN White NonNon.while\
white to ta white t white o white /
Under $5 90.2 97.6 1.1 76.5 95.1 1.2 94.2 97.8 1.0$5 -S9 87.7 94.7 1.1 87.3 93.9 1.1 88.0 94.9 1.1
S10-S14 69.4 79.4 1.1 71.7 81.1 1.1 66.1 78.5 1.2$15-$19 42.1 55.3 1.3 43.1 56.9 1.3 39.1 53.1 1.3
$20-824 25.0 43.8 1.8 24.2 44.2 1.8 27.2 42.8 1.6
$25-829 14.4 31.0 2.2 13.6 30.0 2.2 16.9 34.8 2.1
$30-39 7.7 20.9 2.7 7.1 20.5 2.9 10.1 22.8 2.3
S40-49 4.0 13.5 3.4 3.7 13.6 3.7 5.3 13.2 2.5$50-s59 3.2 10.9 3.4 3.1 11.5 3.7 3.7 9.0 2.4
660-S74 2.8 9.1 3.3 2.8 9.6 3.4 2.7 7.8 2.9
$75-899 2.7 10.7 3.9 2.9 11.9 4.1 2.1 7.2 3.4
$100andover 2.8 13.4 4.8 3.2 14.9 4.7 1.8 7.5 4.2
Total No. of Units Reporting:
White: 6,365.845 4,772.155 1.593.690
Non-whlte 850.063 427,648 422,415
29. USHA, EXPERIENCE IN PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS JOINTLY OCCUPIED BY NEGRO,
WHITE, AND OTHER TENANTS (1944 Annual Conference of Racial Relations Advisers);
ABRAMS, RACE BIAS IN HOUSING 20-5 (1947). For a report of similar experiences in em-
ployment see WEAVER, NEGRO LABOR cc.XI, XII (1946).
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aside specific areas for a particular race, to adherence to a principle of no
segregation. Harmonious race relations were most thoroughly achieved in
those projects which maintained a policy of fully integrating the races, the
residents accepting the new neighborhood standard of no segregation in
much the same way as they had previously accepted segregation in the com-
munities from which they came."' The extent of the mutual respect engen-
dered by interracial living was demonstrated during the Detroit race riots,
when Negroes and whites who had lived together in the same section of the
city showed no disposition to join in the general violence.3 '
An inquiry into this pattern of discrimination should be an integral part
of any thorough attack on the legal problems involved in racial segregation.
Without an awareness of the implications of each decision in relation to this
sociological background, analysis by the courts of the doctrinal issues would
appear to be barren indeed.
LEGAL STATUS OF DIscRItINATIoN IN HOUSING
The central constitutional problem involved in racial segregation is to
distinguish private action from public action. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that: "No State shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 32 Although the Fifth Amend-
ment states without qualification, "No person shall . . .be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law," 31 traditional court inter-
pretation has limited the application of this protection to action by the fed-
eral government.3 4 These Amendments have foreclosed, at least as a consti-
tutional issue, discriminatory action by public authority, state or federal.
But the question remains: what is "public"? The difficulty in thinking of
30. "Where Negroes are integrated with whites into self-contained communities with-
out segregation, reach daily contact with their co-tenants, are given the same privileges
and share the same responsibilities, initial latent tensions tend to subside, distinctions be-
come reconciled, cooperation ensues and an environment is created in which interracial
harmony will be effected." ARAms, op. cit. s upra note 29, at 22. For a case example of
how a policy of race integration succeeded see Hovde, Negro Hotsing irn Pillsburgh, 16 OP-
PORTuthiTY 356 (1938).
The meaningfulness of this body of evidence has been discounted recently in a contrast-
ing of public and private projects: "Moreover, in the former case, the tenant, because of his
economic condition, has little or no freedom of choice respecting living accommodations.
In the latter case, the type of desirable tenant has great freedom of choice." Affidavit of
Gove, Vice-President of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., July 9, 1947. But see Civ. RTs.
REP. 70 for a contrary view.
31. "No Negroes and whites who lived close together as neighbors showed any tendency
to fight each other." LEE, RACE Rior 17 (1943).
32. U.S. CONST. A~mND. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
33. U.S. Coxsr. AEDa. V (emphasis added).
34. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833), is the leading case, and Adamson v.
California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947), the most recent major discussion of the issues currently
being posed.
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any private rights independent of recognition and protection by government,
indicates that "public" and "private" are not separate compartments but
titles for opposing ends of a continuous spectrum.3" Courts have been faced
with the problem of isolating unconstitutional public discrimination from
permissible private discrimination in three recurring types of fact situation:
action by public officials, by urban redevelopers, and by private agreement.
Segregation by Public Officials
That the legal standard of "separate but equal" facilities is inapplicable
in the field of housing and that racial segregation implemented by legislative
action comes within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment was de-
termined by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Bitchanan v. Warley30
Before the Court was a Louisville ordinance providing that neither white
nor colored could purchase or rent property in any block in which the major-
ity of the residents were of the opposite race. Plaintiff, a white man, was
seeking specific performance of an executory contract for the sale of real
estate from a Negro purchaser who resisted enforcement on the ground that
the ordinance made the transfer of clear title impossible. In rendering a
decree for the plaintiff, the Court held that the ordinance violated the Four-
teenth Amendment by depriving the parties of their right to buy and sell
property and hence was no bar to enforcement of the contract. The Court
rejected the "separate but equal" argument employed to sustain the validity
of segregation legislation in other fields, such as public transportation and
35. "As a matter of fact, the courts have never been able to establish any fundamental
distinction between 'public' and 'private' agencies. They all alike live, move, and have
their being in the law. The distinction is largely, or wholly, a matter of custom. That which
has generally been considered to be 'public' is 'public,' and that which has generally been
considered to be 'private' is 'private' . . . , and what was once considered to be 'private'
may later, when conditions change, become 'public'." Barnett, What is "State" Action
Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?, 24 ORE. L.
REv. 227, 229-30 (1945). For the suggestion that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
may apply to the action of private groups, see note 119 infra.
36. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) reversing 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472 (1915).
Many southern cities had adopted ordinances patterned after the original 1911 Balti-
more ordinance preserving, in effect, the block by block racial status quo. In litigation in-
volving the constitutionality of these ordinances, three states, besides Kentucky, held
such enactments to be a valid exercise of the police power. Harden v. Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248,
93 S.E. 401 (1917); but cf. Carey v. Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192, 84 S.E. 456 (1915) (such ordi-
nances are unconstitutional); State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 AtI. 546 (1913) (invalid only
because retroactive and thus taking property without due process); Hopkins v. Richmond,
117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 139 (1915). One state court in a very strong opinion had invalidated
a race ordinance as beyond a municipality's power. State v. Darnell, 166 N.C. 300, 81
S.E. 338 (1914). For discussion of these cases see MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATus or" Tur
NEGRO 139-45 (1940); Hott, Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation Ordi-
nances, 33 W.VA. L.Q. 332, 341-9 (1927).
An even more discriminatory ordinance, which required Chinese to move to a specified
area of San Francisco, was invalidated in the early case of In re Lee Sing, 43 Fed, 359 (N.D.
Cal. 1890).
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educational facilities, on the theory that since land is a unique commodity
it is impossible to provide "equal" housing sites.rr Therefore, the Constitu-
tion required that the opportunity to buy and sell land must be freely
available to all on a non-discriminatory basis. Finally, it was said that the
ordinance could not be justified as a reasonable exercise of the police power!-
Two subsequent decisions have extended the anti-segregation doctrine of
Buchanan v. Warley. In Harmon v. Tyler,9 the state statute and city or-
dinance required the consent of a majority of the residents of a particular
block or area for the purchase or occupancy of any home by a member of the
other race. The possibility of a transfer of property, it as argued, corrected
the defect in the Buchanan case, where the express terms of the ordinance
made any transfer impossible. If no sale actually took place, it would be
not because of the statute but because of the voluntary failure of private
citizens to consent. Although the state courts found merit in this distinc-
tion,40 the Supreme Court perceived no difference and unanimously reversed
per curiam on the basis of Buchanan v. Warley. Thus, segregation ordinances
were unconstitutional despite provision for the voluntary action of private
individuals.
In Richmond v. Deans,41 the ordinance provided that no one might pur-
chase or lease property in any block in which the majority of the residents
were of such race that there could be no marriage between them and the
potential occupant. It was hoped that segregation in housing might be ac-
37. In distinguishing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (carriers), and Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (education), the Court quoted with approval from
Carey v. Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192, 201, 84 S.E. 456, 459 (1915): "The most that was done was
to require him [the Negro] as a member of a class to conform with reasonable rules in regard
to the separation of the races. In none of them was he denied the right to use, control, or
dispose of his property, as in this case." Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80 (1917).
38. "That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling of race
hostility which the law is powerless to control, and to which it must give a measure of con-
sideration, may be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be promoted by depriving
citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges." Id. at 80-1. •
There has been some criticism of the decision on the ground that the Court did not
properly weigh the reasonableness of the legislative action as a means of achieving a possible
public benefit. Martin, Segregation of Residences of Aregroes, 32 Mic. L. RE%,. 721, 726-31
(1934); Hott, supra note 36, at 348-9; cf. Note, 29 KY. L. J. 213 (1941). Prior to the deci-
sion, proponents of the ordinances centered on the police power rationale. Benson, Segre-
gation Ordinances, 1 VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 330 (1915); Hunting, The Constitulionality of Race
Distinctions and the Baltinwre Negro Segregation Ordinance, 11 COL. L. REv. 24 (1911);
Minor, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 18 VA. L. REc. 561 (1912).
39. 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
40. 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925), 36 YALE L. J. 274 (1926). The Louisiana Court
relied on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), mentioning the Buichanan case only as an
afterthought and insisting that it had not overruled the Plessy decision, and that in any
case sufficient distinction existed in the fact that sale was not nowforbidden. Id. at 454-8,
104 So. at 205-7. A concurring opinion called the Buchanan decision "a long step back-
wards in the march of civilization" which ought to be overruled. Id. at 462, 104 So. at 208.
41. 281 U.S. 704 (1930), a firining 37 F.2d 712 (C.C.A. 4th 1930).
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cepted as merely a reasonable method of enforcing the miscegenation laws
which had been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. 42 However,
the Supreme Court, in another unanimous per curiam decision citing Bu.
chanan v. Warley, invalidated the ordinance. Thus, segregation in housing
was not to be excused by being tied to an approved public policy. 43
Despite this clearly established constitutional prohibition, racial segrega-
tion exists through government action in public housing today. There are
many more federally-aided locally-administered projects restricted to one
race than open to both.44 Many more Negroes live in segregated than in
racially integrated projects. 45 However, the Public Housing Administration
has pioneered in establishing projects which eschew race discrimination, and
the Negro has more than his population-ratio share of public housing.41
In the case of the Federal Housing Authority which underwrites loans
for building or remodelling private homes, discrimination against Negroes
has apparently been practiced through informal pressures on banks and other
private lenders.4 7 The FHA Underwriting Manual contained a provision
42. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882). See MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 36, at
236 et seq.
43. Three state decisions, two since the Deans case and the other a year beforo it,
attest to the tenacity of the forces favoring segregation, and also to the adherence of state
courts to the Supreme Court ordinance cases, since all resulted in invalidation of the ordi-
nances. Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1940), 29 KY. L. J. 213
(1941) (ordinance passed in 1930 not litigated until race boundaries were modified in 1939);
Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Oki. 421, 52 P.2d 1054 (1936) (with Negroes moving into white
residential areas, the Governor declared martial law because violence was "imminent," and
directed the city to enact the ordinance); Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 289 S.W. 1067
(Civ. App. Tex. 1926), aff'd, 19 S.W.2d 845 (Civ. App. Tex. 1929), 8 Ttx. L. REV. 298 (1930)
(ordinance provided criminal penalties for violation of segregation agreement signed by
certain whites and Negroes). Compare Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 Atl, 910 (1918)
with State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 Atl. 228 (1913). Compare Irvine v. Clifton Forge, 124
Va. 781, 97 S.E. 310 (1918) with Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 139 (1915).
Cf. Oyama v. California, 16 U.S.L. WEE 4108 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1948).
While Buchanan i. Warley has thus far been consistently followed, the "equal but sep-
arate" standard in non-housing fields is under attack. See Civ. RTs. REP. 79-87; Report of
President's Commission on Higher Education, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1947, p, 44, cols. 2-3;
Note, Segregation in Public Schools-A Violation of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 56 YALIE
L. J. 1059 (1947). See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 16 U.S.L. ,VErK 4079 (U. S. Jan, 12, 1948).
44. As of June 30, 1941, of 380 projects, 327 were for a single race, 194 for whites only,
133 for Negroes only. STERNER, THE NEGRO'S SHARE 320 (1943). As of Dec. 31, 1943, the
FPHA controlled or supervised 705,066 dwelling units. 2 NHA ANN. REP. 97a (1943). Of
these; 27,562, a small minority, provided for occupancy by both whites and Negroes. USHA,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 4. For a brief account of wartime official attempts to establish seg-
regation, see JOHNSON, To STEr THIS TIDE 49-59 (1943).
45. Of 92,476 dwelling units occupied by Negro tenants as of Jan. 31, 1944, almost
65,000 provided for total occupancy by Negroes. Id. at 5. In pre-war projects under 20%
of units occupied by Negroes were in "jointly occupied projects," but during the war, 46%.
McGraw and Home, The House I Live In, 24 OPPORTUNITY 122, 126 (1946).
46. STERNER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 316-20. Negroes occupied 15.5% of public war
housing units just before V-J day. McGraw and Home, supra note 45, at 125.
47. See STERNER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 314-6; Dean, supra note 22, at 430-1.
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which seemingly encouraged race covenants. While this provision has re-
cently been revised, the altered phraseology appears inadequate to require
any change in policy.4 s It has been suggested that FHA operations have re-
sulted not only in the maintenance but even in the extension of race restric-
tive covenants. 49 Thus segregation in housing is apparently being accom-
plished through administrative action despite Supreme Court decisions pro-
hibiting residential segregation through government action.
Segregation by Urban Redevelopers
Urban redevelopment housing, for which neither the label "public" nor
"private" is wholly appropriate, presents a unique legal problem. A major
purpose of the redevelopment laws is to insure that the housing which re-
places the slum buildings of central blighted areas be constructed as far as
possible by private enterprise.60 To this end the laws provide for a partner-
ship of public authority and private capital, and define the duties and bene-
fits of each of the partners.51 Illustrative of the race issue in this new type
of housing is the New York litigation over Stuyvesant Town, the first large-
scale postwar housing development ready for occupancy.
48. Compar "Generally, a high rating should be given ... .where effective restrictive
covenants are recorded against the entire tract, since these provide the surest protection
against undesirable encroachment and inharmonious use. To be most effective, deed re-
strictions should be imposed upon all land in the immediate environment of the subject
location.. . . Recommended restrictions should include provisions for the following .... Pro-
hibition of the occupancy of Properties except by the race for whichl they are intended." FHA,
UNDERWRiTING AL.N AL, par. 980 (1938) (emphasis added); with "If the occupancy of the
neighborhood is changing from one user group to another, or if the areas adjacent to the
immediate neighborhoods are occupied by a group dissimilar to the typical occupants of
the subject neighborhood, or a change in occupancy is imminent or probable, any degree
of risk is reflected in the rating. It is to be noted that additional risk is not necessarily in-
volved in such a change." FHA, UNDERwriNG M ANAL, par. 1320(2) (Rev. 1947) (empha-
sis added). See also Dean, supra note 22, at 430 n. 3; STERNER, THE NEGRO's SnA=u 315-6
(1943); ABRAZ s, THE FuTuRE oF HousiNG 400 n.10 (1946); cf. CIv. R'rs. REP. 70 (1947).
49. MYRDAL, AN AmERicAN DmEmmA 349 (1944). Thus far, for inexplicable reasons,
neither the race discriminatory practices of the FPHA nor those of the FHA have resulted
in litigation.
50. See, e.g., the New York Redevelopment Companies LaI , N.Y. Laws 1943, c.234,
§ 2: Since slum conditions "cannot be remedied by the ordinary operations of private en-
terprise. . . provisions must be made to encourage the investment of funds in corpora-
tions engaged in providing redevelopment facilities . . ." In the absence of public inter-
vention in the form of condemnation and tax subsidy it would not be economically feasible
to build low rent housing in centrally located urban areas. See also Subsidy Taxation for
Urban Redevelopment, American City, June, 1944, p. 76.
51. For an analysis of the complex of public and private elements which make up a
redevelopment project, see Hearings before Commillee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 485--524 (1945); FHA, A HANDBooK oN URBN REEv-Lo!,z- FOn
CIrrS IN TIE UNITED STATES 83-7 (1941); Mott, Urban Rederlopment Legislation Analr-ad,
American City, Aug. 1945, p. 83; Siegel, Real Properly Law and M1ass Housing Needs, 12
LAw & CoNT-mp. PROB. 30, 35-45 (1947); Comment, Urban Rederdopment, 54 YA=E L. J.
116 (1944).
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The constitutional status of Stuyvesant Town can be determined through
analysis of the purposes of the New York Redevelopment Companies Law
and the interrelationship between municipality and redevelopment project
which the law made possible.52 The New York statute provides that "the
public interest requires the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and neigh-
borhood rehabilitation" of slum areas. 53 Twin purposes of the statute are
slum clearance and moderate rental housing. To fulfill these purposes Now
York City, under authority of the state statute, entered into a contract
with Stuyvesant Town and its parent organization, Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance CoP 4 The city contracted to use its eminent domain powers to condemn
all buildings in a blighted area of 18 square blocks for transfer and sale to
Stuyvesant Town.55 Condemnation proceedings forced some 3,000 families
to leave the area.5" Since the statute defined the project as a "superior pub-
lic use," even a public school was levelled at the request of Stuyvesant
Town.57 Further, the city ceded 11 acres of public streets to the proj-
52. N.Y. Laws 1942, c. 845, as amended by 1943, c. 234. Upheld as constitutional in
Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
The latter case only decided the constitutionality of the use of public power to aid privately
owned redevelopment projects. Accord, Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945);
Simar v. O'Toole, 108 N.J.L. 32, 155 Atl. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd., 108 N.J.L. 549, 158 Atl.
543 (1932). See also, Miner, Some Constitutional Aspects of Housing Legislation, 39 ILL. L.
REv. 305, 335-9 (1945).
53. N.Y. Laws 1943, c.234, § 2. The section further reads: "... that the cooperation
of the state and its subdivisions is necessary to accomplish such purposes; that the clearance,
replanning and reconstruction, rehabilitation and modernization of substandard and insani-
tary areas and the provision of adequate, safe, sanitary and properly planned housing ac-
commodations in effectuation of official city plans . . . are public uses and purposes for
which private property may be acquired for such corporations [e.g., Stuyvesant Town] and
partial tax exemption granted . . ."
54. Agreement of June 3, 1943 (cited hereafter as Contract), In accordance with the
enabling statute, the plans for Stuyvesant Town received both the approval of the State
Commissioner of Insurance and the New York City Planning Commission on May 20, 1943,
prior to the execution of the Contract by majority vote of the Board of Estimate. (On file
with N.Y. City Board of Estimate.)
55. Contract § 202 provides that "... the City, at the request of the Corporation,
shall institute all necessary proceedings to acquire by condemnation all of the real property
in the area . ."
56. Although Stuyvesant Town announced a policy of preference for the displaced
families, this preference proved meaningless. According to testimony produced during Hear.
ings before the Board of Estimate of New York City 38 (June 3, 1943) (cited hereafter as
Transcript of Hearings), the inhabitants of the area could only afford to pay a rental of be-
tween five and seven dollars a room per month. Stuyvesant town's apartments rent for
$17 per room. Since no plan had been worked out to house these people, the Stuyvesant
project inevitably caused the remaining slum areas to absorb them. In criticism of such
planless development, see Carlson, Urban Redevelopment Legislation, American City, Nov.
1946, p. 9 3 . See also note 60 infra.
57. N.Y. Laws 1943, c. 234, § 20. Under the provisions of this section no building
was sufficiently important to the public to escape the condemnation process. The result
of condemning the public school is to force every child in the project to travel to schools
outside the area. Transcript of Hearings 25.
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ect 58 and granted it the power to police the development area with a private
police force.5 9 Finally, the redevelopment project was granted a partial tax
exemption of $50,000,000 over a period of 25 yearsS9 In return, Stuyvesant
Town contracted to erect a project to house 9,000 families, and submitted
to governmental controls, including a 6% limitation on dividends 61 and
maintenance of moderate rent ceilings so long as it accepted the tax subsidy. 2
On completion, Stuyvesant Town established a policy of racial exclusion.1
3
Three Negroes who desired to become tenants sought an injunction restrain-
ing the redevelopment company from barring NegroesP In denying the
58. In return for 759,861 square feet of public streets, Stuyvesant Town transferred
234,412 square feet of land to the City to widen the surrounding street area. Net gift to the
project: 11/2 acres. Transcript of Hearings 23.
59. According to Stuyvesant's interpretation of the contract all streets in its area were
to be plainly marked "private." The only person permitted to enter %ithout permission
would be the City Comptroller who was to have the right to check the financial records
periodically. Police, fire, playground services, etc., are all to be under themanagementand
control of the private corporation. Contract §§ 208, 211,506.
60. The corporation receives tax exemption for 25 years on the difference in value of
the area before condemnation and the value of the new project. This involves a charge of
$24 over the 25 year period for every family in New York City. A number of housing critics
attacked the project as a superior slum which would cost the city far more than it was worth.
ABRA.xs, THE FuTuRE oF HousiNG 321-2, 379 (1946); ROSEN.=';, A MuLLIO. Homss A
YE-4R 202-3 (1945); Abrams, The Walls of Sturesant Town, 160 NATioN 328 (1945); Breines,
Stuyesant Town, 4 TAsK 35 (1943). For a favorable comment, see Mferopolitan Life Mahes
Housing Pay, Fortune, April 1946, p. 133.
61. This compares with an average return on its other investments in 1946 of 3.01%,
1946 A.NxuAL REPoRT-ONE OF METROPOLITAN'S GREATsT YEARS 15. See also Reed
The Investnent Policy of the Metropolitan Life, 4 TAsK 38 (1945).
62. Once it gives up the tax subsidy-and pays all back taxes-the project may set
its own rent. For the duration of the tax exemption Stuyvesant Town may raise rentals
only after proving to the satisfaction of the Board of Estimate that it is making less than the
6% for interest and amortization permitted by statute, (N.Y. Laws 1943, c. 234, § 8).
Contract § 504 provides that if the Comptroller "finds that unreasonable expenditures for
operation are being made, the City may request the Corporation to discontinue such ex-
penditures." Additional statutory controls are: the project cannot be sold except as per-
mitted by law (N.Y. Laws 1943, c. 234 § 23); the city's approval must be obtained for any
modification of the project (Id. § 15); upon dissolution any cash surplus belongs to the
city (1d. § 24); rigid controls are imposed over the financing of the Corporation. (Id. §§ 9-
12).
63. This policy was clearly foreshadowed by the statement that "Negroes and whites
don't mix" made by Mr. Ecker, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Metropolitan, quoted
in Abrams, Race Bias in Housing, 165 NATION 67, 63 (July, 1947). The first case to chal-
lenge this early statement of policy was Pratt v. LaGuardia, 182 Misc. 462, 47 N.Y.S. 2d359 (Sup. Ct 1944), a.fd, 268 App. Div. 973, 52 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1st Dep't 1944), leare to ap-
peal denied, 294 N.Y. 842, 62 N.E.2d 394 (1945). Since the project was not to be ready for
three years, the action was held premature.
64. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 118 N.Y.L.J. 163 (Sup. Ct. July 29, 1947).
In answer to the complaint of Dorsey, Stuyvesant Town admitted its policy of racial exclu-
sion. ".... the successful operation of the project and the safety of the investment of
funds . . . require that Negroes should not . . . be accepted as tenants in this project."
(p. 2 of Answer). However, it claimed "the usual powers of management vested in every
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injunction the court relied on the two main arguments advanced by Metro-
politan: first, that the public use and purpose was achieved when the new
buildings had replaced the slum tenements; second, that legislative intent
had been against limitation of the redevelopment company's managerial
discretion in the selection of tenants. Thus, the project was held to be public
until the time for occupancy; thereafter it was private and might establish
a policy of racial exclusion.65 The result of the decision was to confirm Metro-
politan's thesis that the proper legal status of Stuyvesant Town is that of
a private home owner with an apartment to rent.
Assuming that the court's interpretation of statutory purpose cl and in-
tent " is correct, the Stuyvesant Town opinion fails to meet squarely the
basic constitutional issue created by such an interpretation. May a statute
authorize such extensive state action-condemnation of 18 square blocks,
displacement of 3,000 families, tax subsidy of $50,000,000, gift of 11 acres
private corporation which owns and operates a private housing development, including the
,right to select tenants of its own choice." (p. 5 of Answer).
65. The opinion also cited Dury v. Neely, 69 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Kemp
v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1947); and Ridgway v. Cockburn,
163 Misc. 511, 296 N.Y.S.2d 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937), in which the New York courts had en.
forced racial restrictive covenants, as an argument in support of a private redeveloper's
right to discriminate.
66. The opinion construed the purpose of the statute in a narrow physical sense. In
holding that the statutory purpose was accomplished at the moment the buildings were
constructed, the court ignored the broad implications of "neighborhood rehabilitation" re-
quired by the act. That the objective was to clear slums and provide for the housing needs
of lower middle-class income groups is manifest in the continuing controls which the city
maintains over the project. See note 62 supra.
67. Legislative intent was inferred from the following facts: (1) The State Constitu-
tional CoAvention of 1938 refused to include a prohibition against discrimination, whenever
state power and money were used, in the Housing Amendment (N.Y. CoNsT. ART. xvi::).
Const. Cony. of 1938: Cony. Pr. Nos. 10, 18, 49, 203, 380, 625, 691. (2) While N.Y. PUnLIC
HousING LAw § 223 prohibits discrimination in all projects which are wholly public, the
legislature has consistently refused to consider amendments to the Redevelopment Com-
panies Law which would affirmatively forbid discrimination in redevelopment projects,
On numerous occasions bills to accomplish this purpose were buried in committee: 1944
Assem. Pr. Nos. 29, 416, 1321, 1469, 1996; 1945.Assem. Pr. No, 1885; 1947 Assem. Pr.
No. 34. From the legislature's refusal to act against discrimination in redevelopment pro-
jects, the court inferred an affirmative intent to permit discrimination. If the court had
followed the techniques of statutory construction utilized in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), it might well have inferred an opposite intent. See notes 69, 70
infra.
Metropolitan Life contended that without the power to discriminate it would not have
invested the funds of its shareholders, since to so do would involve great financial hazard
(Affidavit of Mr. Frederick Ecker, Pres., Board of Directors, Metropolitan Life, July 9,
1947). However, this statement is contradicted by the fact that Metropolitan contracted
to build the Riverton project soon after New York City passed an ordinance barring segre-
gation in tax exempt projects (Ami. CODE N.Y.C. § J41-1.2, July 3, 1944). This ordinance
does not affect Stuyvesant Town since it is not retroactive. Two other redevelopment com-
panies have contracted to build projects in spite of the ordinance. See Weaver, Planning
For More Fkxible Land Use, 23 J. LAND & PUB. UT. ECON. 29, 40 n.22 (1947).
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of city property, surrender of municipal police power-in behalf of a private
enterprise which intends to pursue a policy of racial exclusion? Stated
differently, the issue is whether a redevelopment project, even though oper-
ated for private profit, is the kind of enterprise which must abide by a pub-
lic standard.
That constitutional questions may arise when discrimination is practiced
by an organization functioning under a statute was recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville .R. RP Although the Court,
in finding that the Railway Labor Act forbids anti-Negro discrimination by
theRailway Brotherhoods, was not compelled to resolve the constitutional
issue,19 Justice Murphy declared by way of concurrence that if the Labor
Act did not forbid such discrimination, it would be unconstitutional under
the['Fifth Amendment." Extending the Steele case, a recent Kansas decision
not only enjoined discrimination in bargaining but also ordered the union
to grant full membership to Negro railway workers7 Thus, the scope of
"public" action was enlarged in order to prevent discrimination by a "pri-
vate" organization; the position of Stuyvesant Town seems closely analo-
gous.
Moreover, a constitutional issue similar to the issue not discussed in the
Stuyvesant Town opinion was resolved by the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Allwrigh1t.72 The denial by a political party of the right of a Negro to vote in
its primary was held unconstitutional because the party was considered a
"state agency." 73 Since the political party was subject to legislative controls
and had received legislative benefits, the party had to act in accordance
with the constitutional standard required of the legislature, the ultimate
68. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
69. "If, as the state court has held, the Act confers this power [to discriminate] on the
bargaining representative .. .without any commensurate statutory duty toward its mem-
bers, constitutional questions arise. . . .But we think that Congress, in enacting the Rail-
way Labor Act and authorizing a labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft ... did not
intend to confer plenary power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit of its members,
rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing any duty to protect the minority." Id.
at 198-9.
70. "The Act contains no language which directs the manner in which the bargaining
representative shall perform its duties. But it cannot be assumed that Congress meant to
authorize the representative to act so as to ignore rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Otherwise the Act would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the Fifth Amend-
ment." Id. at 208.
71. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946), 56 YALE L. J. 731 (1947).
In Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal.2d 586, 591-2,165
P.2d 903, 906 (1946) an injunction was granted against a closed shop agreement obtained
by a union which practiced segregation: "The public interest is directly involved because
the unions are seeking to control by arbitrary selection the fundamental right to work...
although such a labor monopoly is not in itself improper, it carries with it certain responsi-
bilities, and the public dearly has an interest in preventing any abuse of it."
72. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
73. "The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it
by state statutes. . ."1 Id. at 663.
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source of its authority. Since the state legislature could not discriminate
on a racial basis, its instrumentality was similarly enjoined.
The similarity between the Allwright situation and the administration of
redevelopment projects such as Stuyvesant Town seems clear. Taking a
broad view of the nature of a "state agency," the Court recognized in the
former case that suffrage is a matter of such importance that a minimum
of state regulation is sufficient to alter the constitutional status of a private
organization. It would seem that housing is no less important than the right
to vote.7 4 The quantum of governmental regulation of Stuyvesant Town
appears far greater than its counterpart in the Allwright case. While it seems
probable that the political party could function satisfactorily without legis-
lative controls and benefits, 75 Stuyvesant Town could never have been real-
ized without the public aid and power extended by legislation. 6 Since state
action was an essential element in the creation of Stuyvesant Town, it would
seem that the entire enterprise might be considered an instrumentality of
the state and thus subject to the constitutional standard required of govern-
ment itself. To decide otherwise means that a private project can have the
benefits of public subsidy and power, together with the privilege of race dis-
crimination.
Perhaps the most suggestive analogy to the Stuyvesant Town case is
Marsh v. Alabama, in which the property rights of a company town were
held subservient to basic rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
There the Supreme Court held that a privately owned town could not pre-
vent the dissemination of religious literature. While in this decision only
religious and political liberty were protected, the decision would appear most
logically to require company towns to abide by all the standards of the Four-
teenth Amendment, including the equal protection clause. In effect, Stuy-
vesant Town is similar to a company town.7 1 In the area it covers Stuyvesant
74. "Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying some
degree of public control are present." Holmes, J., upholding the Rent Control Act of 1919
for the District of Columbia, in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
75. Following the decision in the Allwright case, South Carolina repealed all state stat-
utes which regulated the conduct of political parties and primaries. Nonetheless, in Elmore
v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (D.S.C. 1947), the court still treated the Democratic party as a
state instrumentality and ordered the party to enroll Negroes and permit them to vote in
the primaries.
76. See pp. 438-9 supra.
77. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See pp. 453-4infra for a more detailed interpretation of the case.
78. Another suggestive analogy to redevelopment housing is the public utility. The
characteristics which distinguish public utilities from other private enterprises are first, that
they are in a monopoly or near monopoly position with regard to control over a vital service,
second, that they are in this position because of governmental action or acquiescence; and
third, that they are so affected with the public interest as to require the application of a
non-private standard. Thus, the courts would surely enjoin an electric company from refus-
ing its services on purely racial grounds. Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co. of Indianapolis, 46 F.
2d 855, 866 (C.C.A. 7th 1931); Philadelphia Rural Transit Co. v. Philadelphia, 309 Pa. 84,
91-2, 159 At. 861, 863-4 (1932). See also People ex rel. Western Union v. Public Service
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Town is responsible for police protection, and makes such vital decisions as
whether there shall be a school or library. In short, it establishes the cultural
environment for a community of 9,000 families. Since Stuyvesant Town has
assumed much of the character of government, standing in a relation to
New York City similar to that of the company town in relation to its state
government, its status as a private government would appear to impose on
it constitutional obligations. Among these obligations would seem to be the
requirement that the housing development open its doors to tenants on a
non-racial basisZ9
Without such a requirement, the validity of the contract between the city
and Metropolitan is open to constitutional attack3P Since the Board of Es-
timate voted for the contract in spite of clear notice of Stuyvesant's intent
to discriminate, it would be difficult to argue that the discrimination was
only an incidental by-product of the redevelopment agreement.8 ' Having
entered into the agreement with knowledge of Stuyvesant's policy of racial
exclusion, the city would seem to have effected racial zoning for a specific
area by contract. To hold such a contract invalid, it is only necessary to
cite Harmon v. Tyler, which declared unconstitutional an ordinance that, in
effect, granted private home owners the power to zone racially.82 Whatever
the means employed, whether the Board of Estimate votes for an ordinance
or a contract, municipal action resulting in racial zoning seems a denial of
equal protection.
The problem of remedy remains. If the assumption in the Stuyvesant To-am
Comm., 230 N. Y. 95, 129 N. E. 220 (1920); Consumers Light and Power Co. v. Phipps, 120
Okla. 223, 225, 251 Pac. 63, 65 (1926): "Under the common law, it -mas the duty of all per-
sons engaged in a 'public business' to treat all members of the public fairly and without dis-
crimination. . ." See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 506 (1946); cases collected in
BARNEs, CASES ON PUBLIc UTILITY REGULATIONS §§ 1.01-1.09 (1934); 1 MCQUILL,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 371 (Rev. ed. 1940).
79. For a discussion of the AllUwright, Stede and Mfarsh cases see Hale, .Rights Under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Andments Against Injuries Inficed by Prirate Indiriduals, 6
LAW. GUILD REv. 627 (1946).
80. In Polier v. O'Dwyer, 118 N.Y.L.J. 796 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 1947), Justice Benvenga
rejected a taxpayer's plea to have the tax exemption provisions of the contract declared
invalid primarily on the ground that all constitutional issues had been settled by his opinion
in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town, 118 N.Y.L.J. 163 (Sup. Ct. July 29, 1947).
81. See Transcript of Hearings (passim). In the course of the Hearings witness after
witness charged that Metropolitan Life intended to discriminate and hence recommended
that the Board of Estimate vote against the redevelopment agreement. Commiioner of
Parks Moses defended the corporation's right to discriminate. Transcripi of Hearings 9-10.
In voting in the negative Newbold Morris stated his reason as follows: "Therefore, because
I care more about the principle than I do about the project, because I cannot vote for public
aid and public sponsorship of a private project, whose officers state with candor that racial
consideration will enter into the selection of tenants, I cast the three votes of my office in
the negative." The final vote was II to 5 in favor of the contract.
82. 273 U.S. 668 (1927). See p. 435 supra. In the Stu)Tesant Town case the City ac-
complished this result by contract, granting the power to exclude racially to the Board of
Directors of the redevelopment company.
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opinion as to the intent of the New York Legislature is accepted, the statute
would appear unconstitutional.83 Alternatively, a constitutional intent may
be assumed, but the contract between the city and Stuyvesant Town may
still be declared invalid on the ground that the municipality, an agency of the
state, acted in aid of discrimination.8 4 Finally, Stuyvesant Town itself may
be treated as an instrumentality of the state. The statute and the contract
may be considered constitutional, but the discriminatory conduct of the
"state agency" enjoined. Since the project is almost completed, practical
considerations would call for the last approach.
In contrast with New York State practice, Pennsylvania legislation gov-
erning urban redevelopment projects provides positive assurance that on
completion such projects will be open to members of all races equally. Utiliz-
ing the covenant device in reverse, the Pennsylvania statute requires that all
redevelopment contracts between cities and private redevelopers include
"a covenant running with the land to the effect that no person shall be de-
prived of the right to live in the redevelopment project . . . by reason of
race, color, or national origin. , 85
Segregation by Private Agreement
The most widely used legal device for accomplishing race segregation in
housing is the restrictive covenant, a mutual agreement among land owners
not to sell the restricted property to, nor to allow its use by, members of
designated races 8 Typically, the covenants cover an entire subdivision or
83. Under the doctrine of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the statute could
be declared unconstitutional on the ground that, although neutral on its face, it was adminigs
tered in such a way as to deny the law's equal protection to Negroes. A fortiori, this result
must follow if the legislature intended to distribute the housing benefits of urban redevelop.
merit on a racial basis.
84. The same court which decided the Stuyvesant Town case denied a taxpayer's suit
brought to enjoin the city from granting Metropolitan the tax benefits called for by the con-
tract. See note 80 supra. Both cases have been appealed and will probably be heard by tile
Appellate Division in February or March, 1948. Communication to the Yale Law Journal
from the American Jewish Congress, Dec. 5, 1947.
85. Pennsylvania Urban Redevelopment Law, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 1701, § 1711
(Purdon, Supp. 1946). See also ADNI5STRAVE CODE OF NFw YORK CiTy, § J41-1.2,
July 3, 1944, which denies tax exemption to future projects which discriminate. Available
data indicate that Pennsylvania and New York City are the only jurisdictions which affirma-
tively outlaw segregation in redevelopment projects.
86. "The form of the covenant is immaterial. . ." Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869, 872
(App. D.C. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945). See also, e.g., Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal.
App. 584, 588, 10 P.2d 496, 497 (1932) (difference between "conditions, covenants and mere
restrictions" immaterial); Edwards v. West Woodridge Theater Co., 55 F.2d 524, 525(App.
D.C. 1931) (equity will enforce a general plan reflecting only parol agreement); Northwest
Civic Ass'n v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 N.W.2d 36 (1947) (immaterial that restriction
not in chain of title); but cf. United Cooperative Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563,108
S.W.2d 507 (1937), where the difference between agreement and deed was decisive in suit for
recission of land sale.
In most cases the restriction is enforced as an equitable servitude, so that actual notice
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desirable street frontage,S and are directed chiefly at Negroes.83
The typical restrictive covenant case has the following steps: sale of a
home in a restricted area to a Negro, occupancy, suit in equity by a neighbor
seeking specific performance of the covenant. Unless there has been some
technical defect in the covenant, 9 the courts will force the Negro to move.
Change in circumstance is the usual ground for non-enforcement, but the
change must be "radical," 90 and some courts insist that the change be in
property covered by the covenants rather than the surrounding property,0 '
a requirement that seems almost impossible to fulfill.
Cases now awaiting decision by the Supreme Court illustrate the typical
settings of restrictive covenant litigation. In each case a white vendor was
enjoined from transfering or a Negro purchaser from occupying covenanted
property. In Kraerner v. Shelle,, 92 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a cov-
enant signed by 30 of 39 owners in a St. Louis block, imposing a 50-year
restriction against sale or occupancy by Negroes or Mongolians. A perma-
is not required; e.g., Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 Pac. 660 (1928). See CLAnx,, REAL
COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WImc "RuN Wrrm LAN" 170-86 (1947).
87. See note 22 supra.
88. A restriction against Negroes has been implied from a covenant directed against
those "whose ownership or occupancy would be injurious to the locality." Schulte v. Starls,
238 Mich. 102, 213 N.W. 102 (1927); but cf. Kathan v. Stevenson, 307 Mich. 485, 12 N.W,2d
332 (1943), Kathan v. Williams, 309 Mich. 219, 15 N.V.2d 137 (1944). Prevailing custom
was decisive in Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110 So. 801 (1926) (white tenant recovers
damages when his landlord leased an apartment in the same building to Negroes, despite
lack of express agreement).
89. E.g., Foster v. Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P.2d 497 (1933) (number of signatories
inadequate to achieve implied general plan); accord, Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W.2d 175
(St. Louis Ct. App. 1939). Oberwise v. Poulos, 124 Cal. App. 247, 12 P.2d 156 (1932) (num-
ber of signatories specified in instrument not obtained); DuRoss v. Trainor, 122 Cal. App.
732, 10 P.2d 763 (1932) (too indefinite a description of the property; inadequate proof of
signature); Stratton v. Cornelius, 99 Cal. App. 8, 277 Pac. 893 (1929) (sale permiksible where
covenant specified only renting and leasing); Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Ald. 480, 41 A.2d
479 (1945) (no showing of general plan). See Jones, Legality of Race Restrictirc Hoting
Covenants, 4 NAT. BAR J. 14, 24-5 (1946); Miller, Race Restrictions on the Use or Sale of Real
Property, 2 NAT. BAR J. 24, 29-30 (1944).
90. Compare Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 362, 34 S.E.2d 522,
528 (1945) (no averment of sufficiently radical change; covenant enforced) willi Picl:el v.
McCawley, 329 Mo. 166, 176, 44 S.W.,2d 857, 861 (1931) (radical change defeats purpose of
covenant; enforcement denied).
91. The most dramatic example is Vernon v. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36
S.E.2d 710 (1946), where the builders could not avoid their self-imposed covenant since
there had been no breach in the subdivision, although the surrounding neighborhood had
become Negro. Other examples are: Swain v. Maxwell, 196 S.NW.2d 7S0 (Mo. 1946); Porter
v. Pryor, 164 S.V.2d 353 (Mo. 1942). Compare Shideler v. Roberts, 69 Cal. App.2d 549,
160 P.2d 67 (1945) withI Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944) and Letteau
v. Ellis,- 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932). Compare Grady v. Garland, 89 F.2d 817
(App. D.C. 1937) with Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F.2d 23 (App. D.C. 1942). See, Note,
Negro Restrictions and the "Changed Conditions" Doctrine, 7 U. or Cm. L. Rnv. 710 (1940).
92. 198 S.V.2d 679 (Mo. 1946), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1751 (1947), Justice Reed
taking no part.
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nent restriction against sale or rental to Negroes in a District of Columbia
block was sanctioned in Hurd v. I-odge.93 The Michigan Court in Sipes v.
McGhee 94 upheld a 25-year restriction against use and occupancy by Negroes
of a Detroit property. These three cases-in each of which the United States
appeared amicus favoring reversal-have already been argued. 9 In three
other cases, petitions have been filed requesting certiorari. In Perkins v.
Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church of Christ,"5 the race covenant was held
unenforcible against an incorporated church on the ground that a corpora-
tion can have no racial identity,9 but the eviction of the Negro minister of
the racially mixed congregation was ordered. A Chinese and a Korean are
the petitioners in the other two cases against the Superior Court of California
for Los Angeles County. s
These cases are typical of American decisions in result and reasoning. In
all but one of the 21 jurisdictions in which the issue has arisen, the en-
forcement of racial restrictive covenants has been upheld.9 The general
93. 162 F.2d 233 (App. D.C. 1947), cert. granted, 68 Sup. Ct. 100 (1947).
In 62 American covenant cases in which the duration of the restriction was mentioned,
44 of the restrictions were permanent, by either express provision or failure to mention
a terminal date. Two cases have been found in which enforcement was denied because
a permanent restriction was involved. Williams v. Commercial Land Co., 34 Ohio L. Rep.
559 (Ohio App. 1931); Yoshida v. Gelbert Improvement Co., 58 Pa. D. & C. 321 (1946).
94. 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1754 (1947), Justice
Reed taking no part.
95. Justices Jackson, Reed and Rutledge disqualified themselves from hearing the
cases, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 16, 1948, p. 1, cols. 3-4. For accounts of the argument,
see 16 U.S.L. WEEK 3219-24 (U. S. Jan. 20, 1948).
96. 79 Ohio App. 457, 70 N.E.2d 487 (1946), appeal dismissed for lack of "debatable con-
stitutional question," 147 Ohio St. 537, 72 N.E.2d 97 (1947), pet'n for cert. filed, June 26, 1947,
16 U.S.L. WEEK 3058 (U. S. Aug. 12, 1947).
97. Citing, at 70 N.E.2d 490-1, People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439,
61 S.E. 794 (1908) (sale to corporation composed of Negroes intending to operate an amuse-
ment park for Negroes not violation of restrictive covenant) and Continental Tyre and
Rubber Co., Ltd. v. Daimler Co., Ltd. [1915] 1 K.B. 893 (though all directors and all stock-
holders but one are Germans resident in Germany, Corporation is not enemy alien). These
cases seem to suggest self-incorporation as an effective method of evading restrictive cov-
enants.
98. Amer. v. Sup'r Ct. and Yin Kim v. Sup'r Ct., unreported below, were decided
Aug. 21, 1947, petition for certiorari having been filed on Nov. 6, 1947. 16 U.S.L. WE=K
3173 (U. S. Nov. 25, 1947).
99. The constitutionality of judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants has been
considered by the highest courts of fifteen jurisdictions. The leading cases are: Fairchild
v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944); Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181
Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919); Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); Hurd v.
Hodge, 162 F.2d 233 (App. D.C. 1947), cert. granted, 68 Sup. Ct. 100 (1947); Mays v. Bur-
gess, 147 F.2d 869 (App. D.C. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945), Reed and Jackson,
JJ., not participating, Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting; Dooley v. Savannah Bank &
Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S.E.2d 522 (1945); United Cooperative Realty Co. v. Hawkins,
269 Ky. 563, 108 S.W.2d 507 (1937); Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67
So. 641 (1915) (first state case); .Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Att. 330 (1938);
Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1754
(1947); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); Kraemer v. Shelley, 198
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rationale is that the law should enforce private agreements where there is
no contrary policy.
An argument frequently made against the enforceability of restrictive
covenants is that they impose unreasonable restraints on alienation. lc' A
S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1751 (1947); Koehler v. Rowland, 27S
Mo. 573, 205 S.V. 217 (1918); Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N.C. 290, 37 S.E.2d 895 (1946); Lyons
v. Wallen, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P.2d 555 (1942); White v. White, 108 NV. Va. 128, 150 S.E.
531 (1929). Clear dicta supporting race covenants appear in Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363,
110 So. 801 (1926). In two cases the approval of race covenants was not directly before the
court but was implicit in the decision of litigation dealing with tax deficiency land sales.
Ocean Beach Improvement Co. v. Jenkins, 142 Fla. 273, 194 So. 787 (1940); Doherty v. Rice,
240 Wis. 389, 3 N.W.2d 734 (1942). (In Clark v. Vaughan, 131 Kan, 438, 292 Pac. 783
(1930), denying enforcement because of change in conditions, the parties raised no issues
concerning the enforceability of the covenant; in Peoples' Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 109
Va. 439, 61 S.E. 794 (1908), the court assumed but did not decide the legitimacy of the
covenant, in refusing to enforce it against a corporation composed of Negroes.)
In five states approval of covenants rests on lower court decisions. Burke v. Kliman,
277 Ill. App. 519 (1934), aff'd on otlier grounds sub nom. Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Il. 369, 24
N.E.2d 37 (1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (res judicata only issue considered); Lion's Head
Lake v. Brzezinski, 23 N.J. Misc. 290, 43 A.2d 729 (Dist. Ct. 1945); Kemp v. Rubin, 188
Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Ridgeway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 311,296
N.Y. Supp. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Ave. Church, 79 Ohio
App. 457, 70 N.E.2d 487 (1946), appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio St. 537, 72 N.E. 2d 97, (1947),
pet'n for cert. filed, 16 U.S.L. WEEK, 3058 (U. S. Aug. 12, 1947); Crump v. Perryman, 193
S.W.2d 233 (Civ. App. Tex. 1946).
Pennsylvania is the sole American jurisdiction in which covenants are apparently
denied enforcement. Although the only two cases found, both in inferior courts, involved
permanent restrictions on sale, the language of the opinions seems broad enough to include
all racial restrictions. Yoshida v. Gelbert Improvement Co., 58 Pa. D.&C. 321 (1946);
Ellsworth v. Stewart, 9 Erie County L. J. 305 (Pa. 1928). See Notes, 162 A.L.R. 180 (1946);
114 A.L.R. 1237 (1938); 66 A.L.R. 531 (1930); 9A.L.R. 120 (1920).
In the absence of judicial action, official committees appointed by Presidents Hoover
and Truman both recommended legislation barring restrictive covenants. PRESwEasT's
CONFERENcE 115; Civ. RTs. REP. 169. That the legislature has the constitutional power to
enact such legislation seems clear in the light of the modifications of private property rights
upheld in the use zoning cases, and in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). The
initial attempt to enact anti-covenant legislation was apparently the amendment propos-ed
last year to the Denver City Charter. This amendment wvas defeated by a close vote in com-
mittee. Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 9, 1947, p. 5, col. 4. In action by a city rather than a
state, the primary legal problem is whether a municipality has sufficient power delegated
from a state. In the case of Denver, the home rule provisions of the state constitution ap-
pear broad enough to sustain city action. COLO. Coxsr. Art. XX, § 1; cf. McCormick N.
Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P. 2d 969 (1939).
100. "Under this restriction a purchaser, in order to ascertain whether he was competent
to take title, would have to trace back his lineage and ascertain if any, even to the remotest
degree, he had in his veins the blood of any of the restricted classes of persons named, which,
I am afraid, would be impossible for the most of us.. . . If this restriction is valid, then one
which excluded as well those of English, Irish, Scotch, German, French or Swedish descent
would as well be valid. Is it possible that such a restriction in a deed could be a valid one?
We can reach no other conclusion than that the restriction in this deed is an unreasonable
restraint of alienation, against public policy and void." Ellsworth v. Stewart, 9 Erie County
L. J. 305, 311 (Pa. 1928). For discussions of the property doctrines, see Bowman, The Con-
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few courts have accepted this argument to the extent of refusing to enforce
covenants against sale while sanctioning covenants against use and occu-
pancy.' Since it is unlikely that a Negro would buy property on which
neither he nor his race can live, a covenant against use and occupancy seems
just as effective a restraint as a covenant against sale. Such a distinction
thus appears unrealistic. 1
2
However, most courts dismiss the argument that race covenants involve
unreasonable restraints on alienation by analogizing them to other restric-
tive covenants,such as those against certain architectural types and indus-
trial use. Both types, it is argued, equally reflect private property rights,
However, the obvious difference between restrictions on land use and restric-
tions against racial occupancy makes this rationale seem meaningless. More-
over, the Supreme Court's decisions upholding zoning ordinances based on
land use but invalidating those based on racial occupancy renders the ra-
tionale untenable. 0 3
The chief argument urged in the current cases against race covenants is
that their judicial enforcement violates the Federal Constitution. Although
the Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley 104 has been considered
by the great majority of state opinions as foreclosing 'this attack, actually
the issue was not decided by the Court. The defendants who were enjoined
from selling and accepting title to the covenanted District of Columbia
property argued only that the covenant per se was unconstitutional. In
affirming the injunctive decree, the Supreme Court thus only decided that
the signing of covenants was not interdicted by the Constitution.0 0 Since
stlitution and Common Law Restraints on Alienation, 18 B.U.L.Rxv. 1 (1928); Bruce, Racial
Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitutions and the Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation, 21 ILL. L. REv. 704 (1927); McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State
Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstlitu.
tional, 33 CALir. L. R v. 5, 6 (1945), esp. at 9 n.17.
101. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919); Porter v.
Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S,E,
531 (1929); cf. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Att. 330 (1938).
In the only case found which deals with the definition of "occupancy," it was held that
there was no violation of a racial covenant in the state's building a fishing site to be open to
all members of the public. Gableman v. Dep't of Conservation, 309 Mich. 416, 15 N.W.2d
689 (1944).
102. See Miller, Race Restrictions on Ownership or Occupancy of Land, 7 LAW. GUILD
REv. 99,101-2 (1947).
103. Compare Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) wital Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) which was extended in Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) and
Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930), both of which were handed down subsequent to
the Euclid decision.
104. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
105. "Under the pleadings in the present case the only constitutional question involved
was that arising under the assertions in the motions to dismiss that the indenture or cov-
enant . . . is 'void' in that it is contrary to and forbidden by the Fifth, Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments .... It is obvious that none of these Amendments prohibited
private individuals from entering into contracts respecting the control and dispogition of
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the contention that state action was involved in the plaintiff's involdng the
aid of a court to give effect to the covenant was not raised until the case
was before the Supreme Court, the Court refused to consider the argument
and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Although there is a brief indication
that its view on this issue might have been aderse to the defendants, lc5
the Court concluded with a clear declaration that it had not considered the
merits of the court enforcement issue.0 7 Moreover, since the case arose in
the District of Columbia and thus could involve only the Fifth Amendment,
it adjudicated nothing concerning the applicability of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."S The issue is thus open for a fresh
legal appraisal. 109
There is evidence indicating that the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
their own property; and there is no color whatever for the contention that they render the
inde ture void." 271 U.S. at 329-30 (emphasis added).
106. "And, while it was further urged in this Court that the decrees of tie courts below
in themselves deprived the defendants of their liberty and property without due process of
law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, tiis contention likewi e cannot
serve as a jurisdictional basis for the appeal. Assuming that such a contention, if of a sub-
stantial character, might have constituted ground for an appeal under paragraph 3 of the
Code provision, it was not raised by the petition for the appeal or by any assignment of
error, either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court; and it li.ewise is laching in substance."
271 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
107. ". . . we cannot determine upon the merits the contentions ... that the inden-
ture is not only void because contrary to public policy, but is also of such a discriminatory
character that a court of equity will not lend its aid by enforcing the specific performance of
the covenant . . .the appeal must be, and is Dismissedfor want ofjurisdiclion." Id. at 332.
108. Although the language of the Corrigan opinion quoted in note 105 supra indicates
that the pleadings were in part based on the Fourteenth Amendment, WINght v. Davidson,
181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901) had already decided that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
apply to the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court has said there is no equal protection
clause in the Fifth Amendment. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943);
Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337-8 (1943) and cases therein cited; Truax v.
"Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 340 (1921). But cf. "The Fifth Amendment as applied to the Dis-
trict of Columbia implies equal protection of the laws." Sims v. Rives, 84 F.2d 871, 878
(App. D.C. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936). For discussion of whether the District
is a "state" for other purposes, see Notes, 55 YAL L. J. 600 (1946); 46 CoL. L. REv. 125
(1946); FederalLegislation, 29 GEo. L. J. 193 (1940).
109. Legal writers agree that Corrigan v. Buckley decided nothing about the constitu-
tionality of state court enforcement of restrictive covenants. E.g., Bowman, Tke Constitu-
tion and Comnwn Law Restraints on Alienation, 8 B.U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1928); McGovney,
Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictire Agreemerts, Co-
enants or Conditidus in Deeds is Unconstitulional, 33 C,%Lu. L. Rz v. 5, 6 (1945); Comment,
Constitutional Law-State Court Enforcemient of Race Restrictirve Corenants as State Aaon
within Scope of Fourteenth Amendment, 45 Mxcm L. RPv. 733, 738-9 (1947) (best defense of
prevailing judicial view).
The General Counsel of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, a consistent
defender of race covenants, in a letter of May 4, 1927, wrote, "The objection that such
restrictions are of such a discriminatory character that a court of equity vill not aid was
raised in the Corrigan case but was not decided."
Although Doherty v. Rice, 240 W',is. 389, 396-7, 3 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1942) refers to the
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ment conceived it as an effective weapon against any state aid to discrimin-
ation, apparently including discrimination by groups or individuals. 10 Civil
rights legislation enacted to implement this wide anti-discrimination pur-
pose, although in part subsequently declared unconstitutional,"' seems a
further indication that the legislators of the reconstruction period held no
narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Still in effect is a civil rights
act providing that: "All citizens . . . shall have the same right . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property." 112 Although this statute has not been
given serious consideration in state court covenant opinions,' it seems to
reflect an anti-discrimination doctrine comprehensive enough to include re-
strictive covenants. 11
4
This broad conception of the Amendment was recognized in Gandolfo v.
Hartman,"' the first case involving the constitutionality of restrictive cov-
Corrigan case as "finally settling" the constitutional issue, an increasing volume of litigation
indicates that such is far from the fact. Of 72 American cases found, 22 were decided in the
decade following the Corrigan decision, while 41 have been decided since 1937.
110. See FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); SWISIUER,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 329-34 (1943); WARSOFF, EQUALITY AND THE
LAW (1938); Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 19, 35-6, 75, 79 (1938); Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amend.
ment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 381, 387-8, 401-3 (1938). See also Appendix to dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 1684,1696 (1947).
111. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For the history and present status of these
statutes generally, see KoNvITz, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 3-106 (1947); Biddle,
Civil Rights and the Federal Law in SAFEGUARDING CIVIL. LIBERTY TODAY 109 (1945); Clark,
A Federal Prosecutor Looks At the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV. 175 (1947); Lee,
Federal Protection of Civil Liberties, 1 EDIT'L RESEARCH REP. 27 (1947).
112. 14STAT. 27 (1866), 8 U.S.C. § 42 (1940).
113. The most likely explanation is that these courts have applied here also the broad
interpretation of "private" action they have read into the Fourteenth Amendment. In
terms of precedent this is a paradoxical view because the Supreme Court decision cited to
sustain this view, the Civil Rights Cases, apparently made an express exception for this
statute. "An individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold properly, to buy
and sell, to sue in the Courts, or to be a witness or a juror, . . ." except under some state
action, which would be unconstitutional, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (emphasis added). This
statute was cited in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78 (1917). Recently it has been re-
vived in Oyama v. California, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 4108 (U. S. Jan. 20, 1948), and in two state
decisions. State v. Ikeda, 61 Ariz. 41, 143 P.2d 880 (1943) (requirement that dealings with
Japanese-Americans be publicized held a violation of the statute); Crist v. Henshaw, 163
P.2d 214 (Okla. 1945) (sale of land to Negro, even in white neighborhood, cannot be a
"nuisance," in face of Civil Rights Act).
114. "Since the injunctions are based on covenants alone and the covenants are based on
color alone, ultimately the injunctions are based on color alone. Even if they were based on
color in combination with other factors they would still violate the Act. Tile Act prohibits
injunctions which depend in any degree upon the fact that the persons enjoined are colored,
for any restriction which is imposed upon the right of colored citizens to purchase and hold
property and would not be imposed upon the right of white citizens to purchase and hold the
same property denies to colored citizens 'the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens.' " Edgerton, J., dissenting, Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d at 241 (App. D.C. 1947).
115. 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892).
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enants, where a United States circuit court concluded, as an alternative
ground of decision,"'6 that to regard the enforcement of race covenants as
not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment would be to give too narrow
a scope to the Amendment's broad sweep. 17 Moreover, on the basis of this
policy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment, two recent Los Angeles mu-
nicipal court decisions have denied enforcement of race restrictive cov-
enants." 8 There is thus some judicial authority that the non-discrimination
conception embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment is broad enough to in-
clude restrictive covenants within its purview.
Doctiinally, to bring the broad prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments into play in a specific case, it must be shown that judicial en-
forcement or restrictive covenants involves action which is both discrimina-
tory and public." 9 Some courts have denied that enforcement of covenants
is discriminatory on the ground that any group may invoke judicial aid in
enforcing covenants. "0 However, in the light of the sociological data already
116. Besides the violation of the Amendment, Judge Ross cited public policy, and a
treaty with China, which granted its nationals in this country the same right as those of
citizens of the most favored nation, as grounds for refusing to enforce a covenant against
Chinese. Id. at 182-3. For a brief discussion of the legal argument against covenants which
may be based on the treaty ground, see note 136 infra.
117. "It would be a very narrow construction of the constitutional amendment in ques-
tion and of the decisions based upon it, and a very restricted application of the broad princi-
pies upon which both the amendment and the decisions proceed, to hold that, while states
and municipal legislatures are forbidden to discriminate against the Chinese in their legisla-
tion, a citizen of the state may lawfully do so by contract, which the courts may enforce."
Id. at 182.
118. Anderson v. Auseth, Los Angeles Superior Court, No. 48408, Dec. 6, 1945. The
second case is reported in Chicago Defender, Nov. 1, 1947, p. 1, col. 8.
119. The accepted view, requiring the "public" element, appears, in the case of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to be based on the word "state" in the Amendment. As for the
Fifth Amendment, the only Supreme Court decision squarely holding that the action of
private groups and individuals is not included is Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
See note 105 supra.
This requirement of "public" has led to procedural difficulties in suits against indiridual
officials of the state and federal government. The doctrine involved requires ".... the
fiction that the suit must be one against an officer as an indiridual to escape the bar of sover-
eign immunity." Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sorereign Immunity Doc-
trine, 59 HARv. L. Rav. 1060, 1079 (1946) (emphasis added). But " .. the officer in pro-
ceeding under such [unconstitutionall enactment comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that [Federal] Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and subjected in his person to the consequences of his indiridual con-
duct." Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (emphasis added). Although the Con-
stitution does not provide a remedy for the violation by individuals of the rights it protects,
such violation may state a cause of action. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (federal court
has jurisdiction in suit grounded on violation of Fourth and Fifth Amendments). Thus, it
might be possible to say that covenants are unconstitutional even before application to the
courls for their enforcement. This reasoning illustrates the difficulties involved in attempt-
ing a rigid "private"--"public" compartementalization.
120. E.g.: "Under similar circumstances the remedy granted here is equally available to
all litigants, regardless of race, or color." Ridgeway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 515,
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presented, this view "amounts to saying that if Negroes are excluded from
decent housing they may retaliate by excluding whites from slums." 121
Since Negroes are specifically rlamed in the typical covenant and therefore
excluded solely because of race, it would seem that judicial enforcement of
covenants is by any common-sense standard discriminatory.
2
Assuming that covenants are discriminatory, one must further show that
their enforcement by the courts involves public action. Since the judiciary
is a co-equal branch of our traditional tri-partite form of government, judi-
cial action would seem to be no less public than that of the legislature or
executive. And it is well established that in supervising the procedural con-
duct of litigation,' 2 ' interpreting the common law,' 2 4 and rendering equitable
296 N.Y. Supp. 936, 943 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Obviously, a restrictive covenant against pros-
titutes may be enforced; "Yet even prostitutes are a class of our citizenry. If one class may
by contract be denied the privilege of use and occupancy, why not another? White may ex-
clude black. Black may exclude white." Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Ave. Church, 79
Ohio App. 457, 70 N.E.2d 487, 491 (1946), appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio St. 537, 72 N.E.2d 97
(1947), pet'nfor cert. filed, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 3058 (U.S. Aug. 12, 1947). The whites would
not be complaining if the racial positions were reversed, Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625,
631-2, 188 N.W. 330, 332 (1922).
"Race restrictive covenants do not segregate negroes. They segregate whites, These
covenants do not connote prejudice. They have been signed by persons in industrial and
professional life whose activities provide employment for thousands of negroes." CIuCAGO
FEDERATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD AsSOCIATIONS, RESTRIcTIVE COVENANTS 3 (1944).
121. Dissent of Edgerton, J., in Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d at 239 (App. D.C. 1947).
122. The extent to which courts shut their eyes to actual discrimination is illustrated by
Mays v. Burgess, 152 F.2d 123 (App. D.C. 1945), involving contempt proceedings against a
Negro woman who had not moved out in accordance with the court's decree in Mays v.
Burgess, 147 F.2d 869 (App. D.C. 1945), cerl. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945). It was proved that
she and her realty agents had made every effort to find another place for her family to live,
but to no avail in the war-time District of Columbia housing shortage. In disregarding this
showing, and continuing the racial covenants here covering 1000 properties, the decision
suggests the close analogy between judicial and legislative action. "May the validity of a
racial covenant be frozen, by judicial action, for the duration of a covenant? The ruling
imposes a novel restraint upon the expansion of Negro and mixed areas, makes the acute
shortage of Negro housing a little more acute and substantially benefits no one." Edgerton,
J., dissenting, 152 F.2d at 125, 126,
123. Patton v. Mississippi, 68 Sup. Ct. 184 (1947), and cases there cited in footnote 3,
dating back to 1879, involve exclusion of Negroes from juries. Examples of other cases in
*hich state court convictions have been reversed are: De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S.
663 (1947) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (denial of right to counsel); Haley v.
Ohio, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 4081 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1948) and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936) (confession wrongfully obtained); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-
dominated trial).
Foster v. Illinois, 67 Sup. Ct. 1716 (1947), Adamson v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672
(1947), Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), and Hysler v. Florida,
315 U.S. 411 (1942), where appeals based on the Fourteenth Amendment were rejected, also
denote that court procedure is state action. #
124. E.g., Craig v. Harney, 67 Sup. Ct. 1249 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); and Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), involving common law contempt;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), common law breach of peace.
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decrees, 125 the courts are subject to the constitutional interdictions directed
towards governmental action in general.' =G Since in the typical covenant
case, the courts are interpreting the common law and rendering equitable
decrees, it would seem that their action in such cases is public action and
thus within the scope of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Marsh v. Alabama, 27 moreover, the Supreme Court extended previous
notions as to what was embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment. In re-
versing a conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for trespassing in violation of
company regulation on the private property of a company town, the Court
appears to have held either the conviction by the state court, or the regu-
lation of the company, to be "public" action within the meaning of the
Constitution.12s If the former was the ground, an analogy to the covenant
situation is suggested. It would seem that a state court decree enforcing
a discriminatory covenant is as much "state" action as a state court decree
which deprives one Jehovah's Witness of her religious freedom. If the com-
pany regulation was the ground on which the Fourteenth Amendment was
applied, a further argument is suggested. In developing its position that
the actions of a company town were circumscribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court suggested by way of dictum that private land owners
together could not so group their property rights as to take action contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 In many residential real estate subdivi-
125. E.g., Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery & Pastry
Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312
U.S. 321 (1941); and Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941) involving injunctions against labor union picketing.
126. Typical statements are: "It is doubtless true that a State may act through different
agencies,---either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibi-
tiong of the [fourteenth] amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protec-
tion of the laws, whether it be action by one of these agencies or by another." Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313,318 (1879).
"If the result above stated were attain&d by an exercise of the State's legislative power,
the transgression of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be ob-
vious.... The violation is none the less clear when that result is accomplished by the
state judiciary in the course of construing an otherwise valid . . . state statute. The federal
guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its
legislati-ve, executive or administrative branch of government." Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 679-80 (1930).
127. 326 U.S. 501 (1946), 44 Mricn. L. RIv. 848 (1946). See Tefft, 3Marhr. Ala1?am:A
Suggestion ConcerningRaciai Restrictire Corenants, 4 NAT. BAn. J. 133 (1946).
128. E.g., "The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press
and religion ... consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a
state statute ... which enforces such action . . .clearly violates the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. . . .That the property rights to the premises where the depri%ration
of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to
justify the State's permitting a corporation to gorern a community of citizens so as to restrict
their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a
state statute." Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,508-9 (1946) (emphasis added).
129. "From these decisions it is clear that had the people of Chicasaw owned all the
homes, and all the stores, and all the streets, and all the sidewalks, all those owners together
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sions, streets are platted, sewers and water mains laid out and the entire
area developed by private subdividers in a manner similar to that of a munic-
ipal government. Where restrictive covenants cover such subdivisions 30
it would seem that they might be considered subject to the interdictions of
the Fourteenth Amendment as visualized in the Marsh case dictum.
Moreover, since restrictive covenants typically cover entire residential
areas, as appears the fact in all of the cases now pending before the Su-
preme Court,' their effect is functionally equivalent to that of a racial
zoning ordinance. Where covenants do not presently cover entire areas,
experience shows that, if encouraged by court enforcement, covenants do
in time cover all of the area available for desirable residences.' 32 Thus, in
enforcing restrictive covenants, the courts are in effect doing what the legis-
lature was specifically forbidden to do in Buchanan v. Warley. Restrictive
covenants, furthermore, may actually be less flexible than zoning ordinances.
While under the ordinance in Harmon v. Tyler a majority of landowners
could have permitted sales to Negroes, in at least one recent covenant case
a majority of the original signatories found themselves unable to avoid the
covenant and permit sales to Negroes a few years after it was drawn up.'33
In judicial weighing of ordinances and covenants, similarity of result should
call for similarity of judicial treatment.
It is sometimes argued that similarity of result is not a valid criterion,
since ordinances involve segregation by direct state action whereas state
courts in enforcing restrictive covenants are primarily implementing private
agreements and only indirectly aiding segregation.' 34 However, a similar
could not have set up a municipal government with sufficient power to pass an ordinance
completely barring the distribution of religious literature." Id. at 505.
130. See note 22 supra.
131. Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233 (App. D.C. 1947), cert. granted, 68 Sup. Ct. 100 (1947);
Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1754 (1947);
Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1751 (1947). As to
the District of Columbia background for the Hurd case, consider: "The chief weapon in tile
effort to keep Negroes from moving out of overcrowded quarters into white neighborhoods
is the restrictive covenant. New building sites and many other areas are now covenanted.
... Even where covenants do not prevail, the powerful local real estate fraternity protects
white areas from 'invasion.' The all-white Washington Real Estate Board has a "code of
ethics' which prohibits its members from selling land in predominantly white areas to
Negroes, and the realtors are supported in this practice by non-member dealers, banks, and
loan companies." Civ. RTs. REi. 91-2. In Detroit, the city involved in tile Sipes case,
80% of residential areas, excluding those old and settled, is covered by restrictive covenants.
BLACK, PATTERNS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS (unpublished thesis, Wayne University,
1948). For the background of the Shelley case, see Note, 3 NAT. BAR J. 50 (1945).
132. That judges should rule on the basis of such experience was well expressed by
Justice Jackson in a recent patent case. "... It is immaterial that the tendency is a creep-
ing one rather than one that proceeds at full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at tile
goal before condemning the direction of the movement." Int'l Salt Co. v. U. S., 68 Sup. Ct.
12, 15 (1947).
133. Schwartz v. Hubbard, 177 P.2d 117 (Okla. 1947) (three years).
134. "But the judiciary does not violate this provision of the federal Constitution merely
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argument that racial zoning ordinances were primarily a valid exercise of
the police power or in aid of some lawful public policy and only secondarily
effectuating segregation was rejected by the Supreme Court in the ordi-
nance cases. 35 In Harmon v. Tyler, it was contended that since a majority
of landowners could permit sales to Negroes the ordinance was primarily
in aid of private agreement. This was considered too flimsy an argument to
warrant consideration.
An additional argument against race covenant enforcement is our inter-
national commitment under the United Nations Charter.'e: The Charter
binds its signatories to grant full rights to all individuals regardless of race.1'-
In Re Drummond Wren,13s the High Court of Ontario found a public policy
against racial discrimination in the United Nations Charter sufficient to
grant a petition to set aside a covenant against "Jews or persons of objec-
tionable nationality." 1" "If the common law of treason encompasses the
stirring up of hatred between different classes of His Majesty's subjects, the
common law of public policy is surely adequate to void the restrictive coy-
because it sanctions discriminations that are the outgrowth of contracts made by individ-
uals." Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 154, 183 Pac. 470, 471
(1919). "In this appeal we are obliged to differentiate between public rights and private or
contractual rights. The former is unquestionably the responsibility of the State, but the
action of a State court in requiring or refusing enforcement of private contractual rights is,
in our opinion, not within the prohibitions of the 14th Amendment." Sipes v. McGhee, 316
Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638, 645 (1947), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1754 (1947). These are
typical judicial statements. See Comment, 45 Mica. L. REv. 733, 740-2 (1947).
135. See pp. 434-6 supra. The Deans case was cited recently for the proposition urged
in the text: "The effect of racial discrimination is not avoided by basing it ostensiby on
some other factor.... So here discrimination against Negro employees cannot be sus-
tained merely because it purports to be based on promotability, which is itself based on
race." Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Tunstall, 163 F.2d 289, 293 (C.C.A. 4th
1947), cert. denied, 16 U.S.L.WEEK 3191 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1947).
136. The U. N. Charter has been duly ratified, 59 SAT. 1031 (1945), and thus has the
status of a treaty which is ". . . by the Constitution of the United States, the supreme law,
and binding not only upon the government, but upon every citizen. No contract could law-
fully be made in violation of their provisions." Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 46
(U.S. 1852). Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892), is precedent for voiding
race covenants as violative of treaty obligations. A segregation ordinance has also been
declared indefensible as contrary to treaty commitments. it re Lee Sing, 43 Fed. 359
(N.D. Cal. 1890). But see Note, 13 U. oF Cn. L. Rsv. 477,481 (1946).
137. CHARTER OF THE UrTEiD NATiONS, Art. 55(c) provides: "... the United Nations
shall promote: .. .universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." In Art. 56,
"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Language almost
identical with Art. 55(c) appears in the Preamble; Art. 1(3) (purposes); Art. 13(l)(b)(duties
of General Assembly); Art. 62(2)(duties of Economic and Social Council); and Art. 76(c)
(trusteeship system).
138. [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674 (Ont. H. Ct.).
139. The court also cited statements by Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, and the World
Trade Union Congress, as well as the Soviet Constitution, Act of Chapultepec and the
Atlantic Charter. Id. at 677, 679-81.
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enant which is here attacked. . . . [N]othing could be more calculated [than
restrictive covenants] to create or deepen divisions betveen existing religious
and ethnic groups." 140 There are obvious inconsistencies in a nation's bind-
ing itself to the United Nations Charter while at the same time lending its
aid to the enforcement of racial covenants.
The constitutionality of the enforcement of restrictive covenants is still
an open issue, but a realistic appraisal of their court-aided effect indicates
that their enforcement is prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.141 As was said by the court in Gandolfo v. Hartman, "Any result in-
hibited by the constitution can no more be accomplished by contract of
individual citizens than by legislation, and the courts should no more enforce
the one than the other. This would seem to be very clear." 142
CONCLUSION
Although there is no easy or automatic solution to the problem of what is
"public" and what is "private" discriminatory action,143 it would seem that
140. Id. at 679, 678.
141. The generality of this view is indicated by the number of amicus briefs filed against
covenant enforcement in the current Supreme Court litigation: E.g., the Department of
Justice, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1947, p. 10, col. 8; the A.F.L. and C.I.O., N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1947, p. 16, col. 2; the American Association for the United Nations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1947, p. 1, col. 2; various Jewish organizations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1947, p. 26, col. 4.
For appraisals of the "public policy" attack on restrictive covenants, see Nassau,
Racial Restrictions on the Alienation and Use of Land, 21 CoNN. B. J. 123, 134-5 (1947);
Note, Anti-Discrimination Legislation and International Declarations as Evidence of Public
Policy Against Racial Restrictive Covenants, 13 U. OF Cni. L. REv. 477 (1946). Sipes v. Mc-
Ghee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 1754 (1947) and Kemp
v. Rubin, 188 N.Y. Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1947) are recent judicial refusals
to infer a public policy against restrictive covenafits from statutes banning discrimination
in other fields.
For discussion of the social considerations which should be weighed in a covenant case,
see Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Reconsideration of the Problem,
12 U. OF CGi. L. Rav. 198 (1945). Increasing judicial awareness of these considerations is
reflected in the dissents of Edgerton, J., in Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 235 (App. D.C.
1947), cert. granted, 68 Sup. Ct. 100 (1947), and Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869, 872 (App.
D.C. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945); and the concurring opinion of Traynor, J., in
Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 831, 834, 835, 151 P.2d 260, 267, 269 (1944): "Race
restriction agreements, undertaking to do what the state cannot, must yield to the public
interest in the sound development of the whole community. . . . It is also necessary to
determine whether maintenance of this barrier would deprive the colored population of any
feasible access to additional housing and compress it within the inflexible boundaries of its
present district at the risk of a congestion whose evils would inevitably burst the bounds
of that district."
142. 49 Fed. at 182 (1892).
143. At one extreme of the "public"-"private" spectrum is action by public officials,
clearly subject to constitutional standards. If this proposition were more widely appreciated,
there would apparently be many seemingly sure-fire suits. Besides public housing, see notes
44, 49 supra, there is, for example, the unlitigated policy of exclusion of Negroes enforced by
the Alabama Medical Association, which is designated officially as the instrumentality for
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the Stuyvesant Town and state restrictive covenant cases involve what any
pragmatic view must recognize as public discriminatory action within the
meaning of the constitutional proscription. In both cases, the participation
by public officials in the discrimination is substantial, and the social interest
in promoting non-discriminatory patterns appears to outweigh the con-
siderations supporting the individual contractual freedom to segregate,
relied on by Metropolitan Life and the restrictive covenantors.114 The in-
creasingly pluralistic nature of our democratic society suggests that individ-
ual civil rights today depend in many instances on the policies of groups
that would traditionally have been considered private. If the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are to continue to serve a significant protective
function, it would seem that their scope must be enlarged to encompass the
activities of modem political and economic institutions.
The forthcoming clarification by the Supreme Court of the criteria applic-
able to cases involving discrimination in housing will inevitably affect the
pattern of future American living. Should the Court declare that race cov-
enants may not be enforced, substantial changes in race-residential bound-
aries would seem an inevitable result. Fuhthermore, the rationale would pre-
selecting public health officers, ALA. CODE, tit. 22, § 1 (1940). "It thus appears that the
State Association, and the County Societies . . . are impressed with public functions and
are in effect the representative guardians of the public health . . . of the State." Walker v.
Medical Society, 247 Ala. 169, 172, 22 So.2d 715, 717 (1945). Despite its status of statutory
instrumentality the Alabama Medical Association refuses membership to Negro doctors and
also effectively excludes them from hospital practice. See CoBa, MEDicAL CARE AND THE
PLIGHT oF TH NEGRO 32-3 (1947).
It is to be noted that action by public officials may vary from close regulation as in-
stanced by a public utility, to the discretionary revoking or granting of licenses and cor-
porate charters. The argument that corporations receive sufficient state support to come
within constitutional standards was considered and rejected by the court in a recent cove-
nant case, Northwest Civic Ass'n v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 NAV.2d 36 (1947), the court
recognizing no differences between individual and corporation; but see Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) for the suggestion that a state may enforce, in the field of race
segregation, a policy for corporations different from that for individuals.
At the other extreme of the spectrum is action not in fact involving any participation by
public officials, e.g., the choice of dinner guests. Any uninvited guest-a trespasser-is sub-
ject to police and court action. Stuch state action, presumably applied to all equally wi1hout
regard to color, creed or rat ionallty, is not within the scope of this discussion. But what if the
owner attests that he objects only to Negro trespassers? Can the state properly protect this
selective use of property?
144. Such balancing of the public interest against the rights of private individuals seems
to have been an important factor in the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U. S. 501 (1946). "The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the in-
habitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct
of his guests. We cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not almays mean absolute
dominion .... When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here . . . [we con-
clude that these property rights do not] justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern
a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of
such restraint by the application of a state statute." Id. at 505-6, 509.
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sumably doom discrimination in such projects as Stuyvesant Town. Such
substantial results would encourage those who see in the law an effective
method of eliminating discrimination from American life. "The pervasive
gap between our aims and what we actually do is creating a kind of moral
dry rot which eats away at the emotional and rational bases of democratic
beliefs." 145 This moral decay has on the whole been aided by the law of
discrimination in housing. The forthcoming Court decisions may well pro-
claim the law an effective instrument to close the gap between existing Amer-
ican race practice and professed democratic theory.
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